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author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2017-11-29 17:29:20 -0600 |
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committer | Bruno Martins <bgcngm@gmail.com> | 2022-10-28 15:39:29 +0100 |
commit | 17d6ddebcc495a17175201cd51e5f54a126ebea8 (patch) | |
tree | ef917c5456924c2927b209610855dfd0ade8e7b1 /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
parent | cbd08255e6f8bd1f43ced8e778e7a34d577772d7 (diff) |
userns: Don't fail follow_automount based on s_user_ns
[ Upstream commit bbc3e471011417598e598707486f5d8814ec9c01 ]
When vfs_submount was added the test to limit automounts from
filesystems that with s_user_ns != &init_user_ns accidentially left
in follow_automount. The test was never about any security concerns
and was always about how do we implement this for filesystems whose
s_user_ns != &init_user_ns.
At the moment this check makes no difference as there are no
filesystems that both set FS_USERNS_MOUNT and implement d_automount.
Remove this check now while I am thinking about it so there will not
be odd booby traps for someone who does want to make this combination
work.
vfs_submount still needs improvements to allow this combination to work,
and vfs_submount contains a check that presents a warning.
The autofs4 filesystem could be modified to set FS_USERNS_MOUNT and it would
need not work on this code path, as userspace performs the mounts.
Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts")
Fixes: aeaa4a79ff6a ("fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds")
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I1707ab45c9b3b23ba9c06bfb4738fc85b8f9e166
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions