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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2017-11-29 17:29:20 -0600
committerBruno Martins <bgcngm@gmail.com>2022-10-28 15:39:29 +0100
commit17d6ddebcc495a17175201cd51e5f54a126ebea8 (patch)
treeef917c5456924c2927b209610855dfd0ade8e7b1 /security/selinux/hooks.c
parentcbd08255e6f8bd1f43ced8e778e7a34d577772d7 (diff)
userns: Don't fail follow_automount based on s_user_ns
[ Upstream commit bbc3e471011417598e598707486f5d8814ec9c01 ] When vfs_submount was added the test to limit automounts from filesystems that with s_user_ns != &init_user_ns accidentially left in follow_automount. The test was never about any security concerns and was always about how do we implement this for filesystems whose s_user_ns != &init_user_ns. At the moment this check makes no difference as there are no filesystems that both set FS_USERNS_MOUNT and implement d_automount. Remove this check now while I am thinking about it so there will not be odd booby traps for someone who does want to make this combination work. vfs_submount still needs improvements to allow this combination to work, and vfs_submount contains a check that presents a warning. The autofs4 filesystem could be modified to set FS_USERNS_MOUNT and it would need not work on this code path, as userspace performs the mounts. Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts") Fixes: aeaa4a79ff6a ("fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds") Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Change-Id: I1707ab45c9b3b23ba9c06bfb4738fc85b8f9e166
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
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