Bluetooth: Replace %p with %pK

The %pK restrictions are used to eliminate exposing kernel addresses.
When kptr_restrict is set to "0" there are no restrictions. When
kptr_restrict is set to "1", kernel pointers printed using the %pK
format specifier will be replaced with 0's unless the user has
CAP_SYSLOG. When kptr_restrict is set to "2", kernel pointers printed
using %pK will be replaced with 0's regardless of privileges.

Change-Id: Iacd8f7b7cdafed3a111507d3da899be9261ff09f
Signed-off-by: Dibyendu Roy <dibyen@codeaurora.org>

1 files changed, 25 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index ffed8a1d4f27..92214d97890b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
 		return -EFBIG;
 
 	if (!tfm) {
-		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		BT_ERR("tfm %pK", tfm);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
 
 	if (!tfm) {
-		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		BT_ERR("tfm %pK", tfm);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 	int ret;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
 	ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	__u8 *keydist;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
 
@@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 					    security_timer.work);
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
 }
@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
 	int ret;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u8 key_size, auth;
 	int ret;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2067,7 +2067,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2113,7 +2113,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u32 passkey;
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2248,7 +2248,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 sec_level, auth;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2305,7 +2305,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	__u8 authreq;
 	int ret;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK hcon %pK level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
 
 	/* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
 	if (!conn)
@@ -2412,7 +2412,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2436,7 +2436,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_ltk *ltk;
 	u8 authenticated;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct smp_csrk *csrk;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2624,7 +2624,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2737,7 +2737,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("conn %pK", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@@ -2919,7 +2919,7 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 
-	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %pK", chan);
 
 	if (chan->data)
 		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
@@ -2936,7 +2936,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 
-	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %pK", chan);
 
 	/* Only new pairings are interesting */
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
@@ -3002,7 +3002,7 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
-	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %pK", chan);
 
 	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
 		bredr_pairing(chan);
@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
-	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %pK", chan);
 
 	/* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
 	 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
@@ -3043,7 +3043,7 @@ static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %pK", chan);
 
 	err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
 	if (err) {
@@ -3095,7 +3095,7 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 
-	BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
+	BT_DBG("pchan %pK", pchan);
 
 	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
 	if (!chan)
@@ -3116,7 +3116,7 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
 	 */
 	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
 
-	BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("created chan %pK", chan);
 
 	return chan;
 }
@@ -3221,7 +3221,7 @@ static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
 	struct smp_dev *smp;
 
-	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %pK", chan);
 
 	smp = chan->data;
 	if (smp) {