diff options
author | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com> | 2019-05-16 22:34:35 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com> | 2019-05-16 22:34:35 +0200 |
commit | 4521d273cfce8afa8a551bc5b9a4aa187fd48c6c (patch) | |
tree | e25f3da3f254d4e93967af2ab6d8394d6167a390 /arch/powerpc/kernel | |
parent | 45246ee0499706ca8b16fa03219676ff2958e198 (diff) | |
parent | 0f654c12cd720e65f1fb3174a7ee468f1daa09e7 (diff) |
Merge 4.4.180 into android-4.4-p
Changes in 4.4.180
kbuild: simplify ld-option implementation
KVM: fail KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS with invalid exception number
cifs: do not attempt cifs operation on smb2+ rename error
MIPS: scall64-o32: Fix indirect syscall number load
trace: Fix preempt_enable_no_resched() abuse
sched/numa: Fix a possible divide-by-zero
ceph: ensure d_name stability in ceph_dentry_hash()
ceph: fix ci->i_head_snapc leak
nfsd: Don't release the callback slot unless it was actually held
sunrpc: don't mark uninitialised items as VALID.
USB: Add new USB LPM helpers
USB: Consolidate LPM checks to avoid enabling LPM twice
powerpc/xmon: Add RFI flush related fields to paca dump
powerpc/64s: Improve RFI L1-D cache flush fallback
powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
powerpc: Move default security feature flags
powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
powerpc/64s: Fix section mismatch warnings from setup_rfi_flush()
powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit
powerpc/64s: Add barrier_nospec
powerpc/64s: Add support for ori barrier_nospec patching
powerpc/64s: Patch barrier_nospec in modules
powerpc/64s: Enable barrier_nospec based on firmware settings
powerpc/64: Use barrier_nospec in syscall entry
powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()
powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_spectre_v1()
powerpc64s: Show ori31 availability in spectre_v1 sysfs file not v2
powerpc/64: Disable the speculation barrier from the command line
powerpc/64: Make stf barrier PPC_BOOK3S_64 specific.
powerpc/64: Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
powerpc/64: Call setup_barrier_nospec() from setup_arch()
powerpc/64: Make meltdown reporting Book3S 64 specific
powerpc/fsl: Add barrier_nospec implementation for NXP PowerPC Book3E
powerpc/asm: Add a patch_site macro & helpers for patching instructions
powerpc/64s: Add new security feature flags for count cache flush
powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush
powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for count cache flush settings
powerpc/powernv: Query firmware for count cache flush settings
powerpc: Avoid code patching freed init sections
powerpc/fsl: Add infrastructure to fixup branch predictor flush
powerpc/fsl: Add macro to flush the branch predictor
powerpc/fsl: Fix spectre_v2 mitigations reporting
powerpc/fsl: Add nospectre_v2 command line argument
powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (64bit)
powerpc/fsl: Update Spectre v2 reporting
powerpc/security: Fix spectre_v2 reporting
powerpc/fsl: Fix the flush of branch predictor.
tipc: handle the err returned from cmd header function
slip: make slhc_free() silently accept an error pointer
intel_th: gth: Fix an off-by-one in output unassigning
fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: Fix a NULL pointer dereference
NFS: Forbid setting AF_INET6 to "struct sockaddr_in"->sin_family.
netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: drop a bogus WARN_ON
tipc: check bearer name with right length in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable
tipc: check link name with right length in tipc_nl_compat_link_set
bpf: reject wrong sized filters earlier
Revert "block/loop: Use global lock for ioctl() operation."
ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure()
team: fix possible recursive locking when add slaves
net: stmmac: move stmmac_check_ether_addr() to driver probe
ipv4: set the tcp_min_rtt_wlen range from 0 to one day
powerpc/fsl: Enable runtime patching if nospectre_v2 boot arg is used
powerpc/fsl: Flush branch predictor when entering KVM
powerpc/fsl: Emulate SPRN_BUCSR register
powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (32 bit)
powerpc/fsl: Sanitize the syscall table for NXP PowerPC 32 bit platforms
powerpc/fsl: Fixed warning: orphan section `__btb_flush_fixup'
powerpc/fsl: Add FSL_PPC_BOOK3E as supported arch for nospectre_v2 boot arg
Documentation: Add nospectre_v1 parameter
usbnet: ipheth: prevent TX queue timeouts when device not ready
usbnet: ipheth: fix potential null pointer dereference in ipheth_carrier_set
qlcnic: Avoid potential NULL pointer dereference
netfilter: bridge: set skb transport_header before entering NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING
sc16is7xx: missing unregister/delete driver on error in sc16is7xx_init()
usb: gadget: net2280: Fix overrun of OUT messages
usb: gadget: net2280: Fix net2280_dequeue()
usb: gadget: net2272: Fix net2272_dequeue()
ARM: dts: pfla02: increase phy reset duration
net: ks8851: Dequeue RX packets explicitly
net: ks8851: Reassert reset pin if chip ID check fails
net: ks8851: Delay requesting IRQ until opened
net: ks8851: Set initial carrier state to down
net: xilinx: fix possible object reference leak
net: ibm: fix possible object reference leak
net: ethernet: ti: fix possible object reference leak
scsi: qla4xxx: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
usb: u132-hcd: fix resource leak
ceph: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal
scsi: zfcp: reduce flood of fcrscn1 trace records on multi-element RSCN
libata: fix using DMA buffers on stack
kconfig/[mn]conf: handle backspace (^H) key
vfio/type1: Limit DMA mappings per container
ALSA: line6: use dynamic buffers
ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation
ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid()
ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode
bnxt_en: Improve multicast address setup logic.
packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly
USB: yurex: Fix protection fault after device removal
USB: w1 ds2490: Fix bug caused by improper use of altsetting array
USB: core: Fix unterminated string returned by usb_string()
USB: core: Fix bug caused by duplicate interface PM usage counter
HID: debug: fix race condition with between rdesc_show() and device removal
rtc: sh: Fix invalid alarm warning for non-enabled alarm
igb: Fix WARN_ONCE on runtime suspend
bonding: show full hw address in sysfs for slave entries
jffs2: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal
debugfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal
rtc: da9063: set uie_unsupported when relevant
vfio/pci: use correct format characters
scsi: storvsc: Fix calculation of sub-channel count
net: hns: Use NAPI_POLL_WEIGHT for hns driver
net: hns: Fix WARNING when remove HNS driver with SMMU enabled
hugetlbfs: fix memory leak for resv_map
xsysace: Fix error handling in ace_setup
ARM: orion: don't use using 64-bit DMA masks
ARM: iop: don't use using 64-bit DMA masks
usb: usbip: fix isoc packet num validation in get_pipe
staging: iio: adt7316: allow adt751x to use internal vref for all dacs
staging: iio: adt7316: fix the dac read calculation
staging: iio: adt7316: fix the dac write calculation
Input: snvs_pwrkey - initialize necessary driver data before enabling IRQ
selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover, p2
media: v4l2: i2c: ov7670: Fix PLL bypass register values
scsi: libsas: fix a race condition when smp task timeout
ASoC:soc-pcm:fix a codec fixup issue in TDM case
ASoC: cs4270: Set auto-increment bit for register writes
ASoC: tlv320aic32x4: Fix Common Pins
perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS
scsi: csiostor: fix missing data copy in csio_scsi_err_handler()
iommu/amd: Set exclusion range correctly
genirq: Prevent use-after-free and work list corruption
usb: dwc3: Fix default lpm_nyet_threshold value
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix incorrect region-size setting in optrom SYSFS routines
Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections
UAS: fix alignment of scatter/gather segments
ipv6: fix a potential deadlock in do_ipv6_setsockopt()
ASoC: Intel: avoid Oops if DMA setup fails
timer/debug: Change /proc/timer_stats from 0644 to 0600
netfilter: compat: initialize all fields in xt_init
platform/x86: sony-laptop: Fix unintentional fall-through
iio: adc: xilinx: fix potential use-after-free on remove
HID: input: add mapping for Expose/Overview key
HID: input: add mapping for keyboard Brightness Up/Down/Toggle keys
libnvdimm/btt: Fix a kmemdup failure check
s390/dasd: Fix capacity calculation for large volumes
s390/3270: fix lockdep false positive on view->lock
KVM: x86: avoid misreporting level-triggered irqs as edge-triggered in tracing
tools lib traceevent: Fix missing equality check for strcmp
init: initialize jump labels before command line option parsing
ipvs: do not schedule icmp errors from tunnels
s390: ctcm: fix ctcm_new_device error return code
selftests/net: correct the return value for run_netsocktests
gpu: ipu-v3: dp: fix CSC handling
cw1200: fix missing unlock on error in cw1200_hw_scan()
x86/vdso: Pass --eh-frame-hdr to the linker
Don't jump to compute_result state from check_result state
locking/static_keys: Provide DECLARE and well as DEFINE macros
x86/microcode/intel: Add a helper which gives the microcode revision
x86: stop exporting msr-index.h to userland
bitops: avoid integer overflow in GENMASK(_ULL)
x86/microcode/intel: Check microcode revision before updating sibling threads
x86/MCE: Save microcode revision in machine check records
x86/cpufeatures: Hide AMD-specific speculation flags
x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs
x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic
x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NO
x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage
x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU features
locking/atomics, asm-generic: Move some macros from <linux/bitops.h> to a new <linux/bits.h> file
x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
x86/speculation: Remove SPECTRE_V2_IBRS in enum spectre_v2_mitigation
x86/microcode: Make sure boot_cpu_data.microcode is up-to-date
x86/microcode: Update the new microcode revision unconditionally
x86/cpu: Sanitize FAM6_ATOM naming
KVM: x86: SVM: Call x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest/host() with interrupts disabled
x86/mm: Use WRITE_ONCE() when setting PTEs
x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation
x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment
x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common()
x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common()
x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use
x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions
x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update
x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled
sched: Add sched_smt_active()
x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
kvm: x86: Report STIBP on GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines
x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists
x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
x86/speculation/l1tf: Document l1tf in sysfs
x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
x86/cpu/bugs: Use __initconst for 'const' init data
x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
x86/bugs: Change L1TF mitigation string to match upstream
USB: serial: use variable for status
USB: serial: fix unthrottle races
powerpc/64s: Include cpu header
bridge: Fix error path for kobject_init_and_add()
net: ucc_geth - fix Oops when changing number of buffers in the ring
packet: Fix error path in packet_init
vlan: disable SIOCSHWTSTAMP in container
vrf: sit mtu should not be updated when vrf netdev is the link
ipv4: Fix raw socket lookup for local traffic
bonding: fix arp_validate toggling in active-backup mode
drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c: dereferencing error pointers in ioctl
drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c: prevent integer overflow in ioctl
powerpc/booke64: set RI in default MSR
powerpc/lib: fix book3s/32 boot failure due to code patching
Linux 4.4.180
Change-Id: I72f6c596cc992689d95abc8b5d1303d6ec22b051
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_32.S | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S | 69 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 98 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/module.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 434 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_32.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 33 |
13 files changed, 690 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index ba336930d448..22ed3c32fca8 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_power.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += mce.o mce_power.o obj64-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) += reloc_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64) += exceptions-64e.o idle_book3e.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC) += security.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += vdso64/ obj-$(CONFIG_ALTIVEC) += vecemu.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_970_NAP) += idle_power4.o diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c index d92705e3a0c1..de3c29c51503 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -245,8 +245,7 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(PACA_IN_MCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, in_mce)); DEFINE(PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA, offsetof(struct paca_struct, rfi_flush_fallback_area)); DEFINE(PACA_EXRFI, offsetof(struct paca_struct, exrfi)); - DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_congruence)); - DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_sets)); + DEFINE(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, l1d_flush_size)); #endif DEFINE(PACAHWCPUID, offsetof(struct paca_struct, hw_cpu_id)); DEFINE(PACAKEXECSTATE, offsetof(struct paca_struct, kexec_state)); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_32.S index 3728e617e17e..609bc7d01f13 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_32.S @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include <asm/unistd.h> #include <asm/ftrace.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h> +#include <asm/barrier.h> /* * MSR_KERNEL is > 0x10000 on 4xx/Book-E since it include MSR_CE. @@ -340,6 +341,15 @@ syscall_dotrace_cont: ori r10,r10,sys_call_table@l slwi r0,r0,2 bge- 66f + + barrier_nospec_asm + /* + * Prevent the load of the handler below (based on the user-passed + * system call number) being speculatively executed until the test + * against NR_syscalls and branch to .66f above has + * committed. + */ + lwzx r10,r10,r0 /* Fetch system call handler [ptr] */ mtlr r10 addi r9,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S index 59be96917369..6d36a4fb4acf 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/mmu.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/code-patching-asm.h> #include <asm/ppc_asm.h> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/cputable.h> @@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ #include <asm/hw_irq.h> #include <asm/context_tracking.h> #include <asm/tm.h> +#include <asm/barrier.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S #include <asm/exception-64s.h> #else @@ -75,6 +77,11 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_TM) std r0,GPR0(r1) std r10,GPR1(r1) beq 2f /* if from kernel mode */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E +START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION + BTB_FLUSH(r10) +END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION +#endif ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_ENTRY(r10, r11) 2: std r2,GPR2(r1) std r3,GPR3(r1) @@ -177,6 +184,15 @@ system_call: /* label this so stack traces look sane */ clrldi r8,r8,32 15: slwi r0,r0,4 + + barrier_nospec_asm + /* + * Prevent the load of the handler below (based on the user-passed + * system call number) being speculatively executed until the test + * against NR_syscalls and branch to .Lsyscall_enosys above has + * committed. + */ + ldx r12,r11,r0 /* Fetch system call handler [ptr] */ mtctr r12 bctrl /* Call handler */ @@ -440,6 +456,57 @@ _GLOBAL(ret_from_kernel_thread) li r3,0 b .Lsyscall_exit +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 + +#define FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE \ +1: nop; \ + patch_site 1b, patch__call_flush_count_cache + + +#define BCCTR_FLUSH .long 0x4c400420 + +.macro nops number + .rept \number + nop + .endr +.endm + +.balign 32 +.global flush_count_cache +flush_count_cache: + /* Save LR into r9 */ + mflr r9 + + .rept 64 + bl .+4 + .endr + b 1f + nops 6 + + .balign 32 + /* Restore LR */ +1: mtlr r9 + li r9,0x7fff + mtctr r9 + + BCCTR_FLUSH + +2: nop + patch_site 2b patch__flush_count_cache_return + + nops 3 + + .rept 278 + .balign 32 + BCCTR_FLUSH + nops 7 + .endr + + blr +#else +#define FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ + /* * This routine switches between two different tasks. The process * state of one is saved on its kernel stack. Then the state @@ -503,6 +570,8 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) #endif + FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* We need a sync somewhere here to make sure that if the * previous task gets rescheduled on another CPU, it sees all diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S index 5cc93f0b52ca..48ec841ea1bf 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S @@ -295,7 +295,8 @@ ret_from_mc_except: andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR; /* save stack pointer */ \ beq 1f; /* branch around if supervisor */ \ ld r1,PACAKSAVE(r13); /* get kernel stack coming from usr */\ -1: cmpdi cr1,r1,0; /* check if SP makes sense */ \ +1: type##_BTB_FLUSH \ + cmpdi cr1,r1,0; /* check if SP makes sense */ \ bge- cr1,exc_##n##_bad_stack;/* bad stack (TODO: out of line) */ \ mfspr r10,SPRN_##type##_SRR0; /* read SRR0 before touching stack */ @@ -327,6 +328,30 @@ ret_from_mc_except: #define SPRN_MC_SRR0 SPRN_MCSRR0 #define SPRN_MC_SRR1 SPRN_MCSRR1 +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E +#define GEN_BTB_FLUSH \ + START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION \ + beq 1f; \ + BTB_FLUSH(r10) \ + 1: \ + END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION + +#define CRIT_BTB_FLUSH \ + START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION \ + BTB_FLUSH(r10) \ + END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION + +#define DBG_BTB_FLUSH CRIT_BTB_FLUSH +#define MC_BTB_FLUSH CRIT_BTB_FLUSH +#define GDBELL_BTB_FLUSH GEN_BTB_FLUSH +#else +#define GEN_BTB_FLUSH +#define CRIT_BTB_FLUSH +#define DBG_BTB_FLUSH +#define MC_BTB_FLUSH +#define GDBELL_BTB_FLUSH +#endif + #define NORMAL_EXCEPTION_PROLOG(n, intnum, addition) \ EXCEPTION_PROLOG(n, intnum, GEN, addition##_GEN(n)) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S index 938a30fef031..10e7cec9553d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION \ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_REAL_LE) \ mr r9,r13 ; \ GET_PACA(r13) ; \ + INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL ; \ mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0 ; \ 0: @@ -292,7 +293,9 @@ hardware_interrupt_hv: . = 0x900 .globl decrementer_pSeries decrementer_pSeries: - _MASKABLE_EXCEPTION_PSERIES(0x900, decrementer, EXC_STD, SOFTEN_TEST_PR) + SET_SCRATCH0(r13) + EXCEPTION_PROLOG_0(PACA_EXGEN) + b decrementer_ool STD_EXCEPTION_HV(0x980, 0x982, hdecrementer) @@ -319,6 +322,7 @@ system_call_pSeries: OPT_GET_SPR(r9, SPRN_PPR, CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR); HMT_MEDIUM; std r10,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R10(r13) + INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL OPT_SAVE_REG_TO_PACA(PACA_EXGEN+EX_PPR, r9, CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR); mfcr r9 KVMTEST(0xc00) @@ -607,6 +611,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR) .align 7 /* moved from 0xe00 */ + MASKABLE_EXCEPTION_OOL(0x900, decrementer) STD_EXCEPTION_HV_OOL(0xe02, h_data_storage) KVM_HANDLER_SKIP(PACA_EXGEN, EXC_HV, 0xe02) STD_EXCEPTION_HV_OOL(0xe22, h_instr_storage) @@ -1564,6 +1569,21 @@ power4_fixup_nap: blr #endif + .balign 16 + .globl stf_barrier_fallback +stf_barrier_fallback: + std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + sync + ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + ori 31,31,0 + .rept 14 + b 1f +1: + .endr + blr + .globl rfi_flush_fallback rfi_flush_fallback: SET_SCRATCH0(r13); @@ -1571,39 +1591,37 @@ rfi_flush_fallback: std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) - std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) - std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) mfctr r9 ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13) - ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13) - ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13) - /* - * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, - * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not - * hurt). - */ - addi r12,r12,8 + ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13) + srdi r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */ mtctr r11 DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */ /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */ sync -1: li r8,0 - .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */ - ldx r11,r10,r8 - add r8,r8,r12 - xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not - add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx - .endr - addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */ + + /* + * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, + * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not + * hurt). + */ +1: + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10) + addi r10,r10,0x80*8 bdnz 1b mtctr r9 ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) - ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) - ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) GET_SCRATCH0(r13); rfid @@ -1614,39 +1632,37 @@ hrfi_flush_fallback: std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) - std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) - std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) mfctr r9 ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13) - ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13) - ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13) - /* - * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, - * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not - * hurt). - */ - addi r12,r12,8 + ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13) + srdi r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */ mtctr r11 DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */ /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */ sync -1: li r8,0 - .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */ - ldx r11,r10,r8 - add r8,r8,r12 - xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not - add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx - .endr - addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */ + + /* + * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, + * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not + * hurt). + */ +1: + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10) + addi r10,r10,0x80*8 bdnz 1b mtctr r9 ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) - ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13) - ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13) GET_SCRATCH0(r13); hrfid diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h index a620203f7de3..7b98c7351f6c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_booke.h @@ -31,6 +31,16 @@ */ #define THREAD_NORMSAVE(offset) (THREAD_NORMSAVES + (offset * 4)) +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E +#define BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(reg) \ +START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION \ + BTB_FLUSH(reg) \ +END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION +#else +#define BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(reg) +#endif + + #define NORMAL_EXCEPTION_PROLOG(intno) \ mtspr SPRN_SPRG_WSCRATCH0, r10; /* save one register */ \ mfspr r10, SPRN_SPRG_THREAD; \ @@ -42,6 +52,7 @@ andi. r11, r11, MSR_PR; /* check whether user or kernel */\ mr r11, r1; \ beq 1f; \ + BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(r11) \ /* if from user, start at top of this thread's kernel stack */ \ lwz r11, THREAD_INFO-THREAD(r10); \ ALLOC_STACK_FRAME(r11, THREAD_SIZE); \ @@ -127,6 +138,7 @@ stw r9,_CCR(r8); /* save CR on stack */\ mfspr r11,exc_level_srr1; /* check whether user or kernel */\ DO_KVM BOOKE_INTERRUPT_##intno exc_level_srr1; \ + BOOKE_CLEAR_BTB(r10) \ andi. r11,r11,MSR_PR; \ mfspr r11,SPRN_SPRG_THREAD; /* if from user, start at top of */\ lwz r11,THREAD_INFO-THREAD(r11); /* this thread's kernel stack */\ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S index fffd1f96bb1d..275769b6fb0d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S @@ -451,6 +451,13 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV) mfcr r13 stw r13, THREAD_NORMSAVE(3)(r10) DO_KVM BOOKE_INTERRUPT_DTLB_MISS SPRN_SRR1 +START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION + mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1 + andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR + beq 1f + BTB_FLUSH(r10) +1: +END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION mfspr r10, SPRN_DEAR /* Get faulting address */ /* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the @@ -545,6 +552,14 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV) mfcr r13 stw r13, THREAD_NORMSAVE(3)(r10) DO_KVM BOOKE_INTERRUPT_ITLB_MISS SPRN_SRR1 +START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION + mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1 + andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR + beq 1f + BTB_FLUSH(r10) +1: +END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION + mfspr r10, SPRN_SRR0 /* Get faulting address */ /* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module.c index 9547381b631a..ff009be97a42 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module.c @@ -67,7 +67,15 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, do_feature_fixups(powerpc_firmware_features, (void *)sect->sh_addr, (void *)sect->sh_addr + sect->sh_size); -#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC + sect = find_section(hdr, sechdrs, "__spec_barrier_fixup"); + if (sect != NULL) + do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(barrier_nospec_enabled, + (void *)sect->sh_addr, + (void *)sect->sh_addr + sect->sh_size); +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC */ sect = find_section(hdr, sechdrs, "__lwsync_fixup"); if (sect != NULL) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fe30ddfd51ee --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c @@ -0,0 +1,434 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +// +// Security related flags and so on. +// +// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation. + +#include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/seq_buf.h> + +#include <asm/debug.h> +#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> +#include <asm/code-patching.h> +#include <asm/security_features.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> + + +unsigned long powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = SEC_FTR_DEFAULT; + +enum count_cache_flush_type { + COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1, + COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW = 0x2, + COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW = 0x4, +}; +static enum count_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE; + +bool barrier_nospec_enabled; +static bool no_nospec; +static bool btb_flush_enabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E +static bool no_spectrev2; +#endif + +static void enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable) +{ + barrier_nospec_enabled = enable; + do_barrier_nospec_fixups(enable); +} + +void setup_barrier_nospec(void) +{ + bool enable; + + /* + * It would make sense to check SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 below as well. + * But there's a good reason not to. The two flags we check below are + * both are enabled by default in the kernel, so if the hcall is not + * functional they will be enabled. + * On a system where the host firmware has been updated (so the ori + * functions as a barrier), but on which the hypervisor (KVM/Qemu) has + * not been updated, we would like to enable the barrier. Dropping the + * check for SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 achieves that. The only downside is + * we potentially enable the barrier on systems where the host firmware + * is not updated, but that's harmless as it's a no-op. + */ + enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && + security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR); + + if (!no_nospec) + enable_barrier_nospec(enable); +} + +static int __init handle_nospectre_v1(char *p) +{ + no_nospec = true; + + return 0; +} +early_param("nospectre_v1", handle_nospectre_v1); + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS +static int barrier_nospec_set(void *data, u64 val) +{ + switch (val) { + case 0: + case 1: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!!val == !!barrier_nospec_enabled) + return 0; + + enable_barrier_nospec(!!val); + + return 0; +} + +static int barrier_nospec_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + *val = barrier_nospec_enabled ? 1 : 0; + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_barrier_nospec, + barrier_nospec_get, barrier_nospec_set, "%llu\n"); + +static __init int barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("barrier_nospec", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, + &fops_barrier_nospec); + return 0; +} +device_initcall(barrier_nospec_debugfs_init); +#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E +static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p) +{ + no_spectrev2 = true; + + return 0; +} +early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2); +void setup_spectre_v2(void) +{ + if (no_spectrev2) + do_btb_flush_fixups(); + else + btb_flush_enabled = true; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + bool thread_priv; + + thread_priv = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV); + + if (rfi_flush || thread_priv) { + struct seq_buf s; + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); + + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: "); + + if (rfi_flush) + seq_buf_printf(&s, "RFI Flush"); + + if (rfi_flush && thread_priv) + seq_buf_printf(&s, ", "); + + if (thread_priv) + seq_buf_printf(&s, "L1D private per thread"); + + seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); + + return s.len; + } + + if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && + !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} +#endif + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + struct seq_buf s; + + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); + + if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) { + if (barrier_nospec_enabled) + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization"); + else + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable"); + + if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31)) + seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled"); + + seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); + } else + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Not affected\n"); + + return s.len; +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + struct seq_buf s; + bool bcs, ccd; + + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); + + bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED); + ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED); + + if (bcs || ccd) { + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: "); + + if (bcs) + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)"); + + if (bcs && ccd) + seq_buf_printf(&s, ", "); + + if (ccd) + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled"); + } else if (count_cache_flush_type != COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) { + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush"); + + if (count_cache_flush_type == COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) + seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)"); + } else if (btb_flush_enabled) { + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush"); + } else { + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable"); + } + + seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); + + return s.len; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +/* + * Store-forwarding barrier support. + */ + +static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types; +static bool no_stf_barrier; +bool stf_barrier; + +static int __init handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p) +{ + pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line."); + no_stf_barrier = true; + return 0; +} + +early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier); + +/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */ +static int __init handle_ssbd(char *p) +{ + if (!p || strncmp(p, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0 ) { + /* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */ + return 0; + } else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) { + handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL); + return 0; + } else + return 1; + + return 0; +} +early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd); + +/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */ +static int __init handle_no_ssbd(char *p) +{ + handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL); + return 0; +} +early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd); + +static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable) +{ + if (enable) + do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types); + else + do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE); + + stf_barrier = enable; +} + +void setup_stf_barrier(void) +{ + enum stf_barrier_type type; + bool enable, hv; + + hv = cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE); + + /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */ + if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) + type = STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI; + else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206)) + type = STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK; + else + type = STF_BARRIER_NONE; + + enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && + (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) || + (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && hv)); + + if (type == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) { + pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n"); + } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) { + pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n"); + } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) { + pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n"); + } + + stf_enabled_flush_types = type; + + if (!no_stf_barrier) + stf_barrier_enable(enable); +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (stf_barrier && stf_enabled_flush_types != STF_BARRIER_NONE) { + const char *type; + switch (stf_enabled_flush_types) { + case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO: + type = "eieio"; + break; + case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI: + type = "hwsync"; + break; + case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK: + type = "fallback"; + break; + default: + type = "unknown"; + } + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type); + } + + if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && + !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS +static int stf_barrier_set(void *data, u64 val) +{ + bool enable; + + if (val == 1) + enable = true; + else if (val == 0) + enable = false; + else + return -EINVAL; + + /* Only do anything if we're changing state */ + if (enable != stf_barrier) + stf_barrier_enable(enable); + + return 0; +} + +static int stf_barrier_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + *val = stf_barrier ? 1 : 0; + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier, stf_barrier_get, stf_barrier_set, "%llu\n"); + +static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("stf_barrier", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_stf_barrier); + return 0; +} +device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init); +#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ + +static void toggle_count_cache_flush(bool enable) +{ + if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) { + patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache, PPC_INST_NOP); + count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE; + pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush disabled.\n"); + return; + } + + patch_branch_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache, + (u64)&flush_count_cache, BRANCH_SET_LINK); + + if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) { + count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW; + pr_info("count-cache-flush: full software flush sequence enabled.\n"); + return; + } + + patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_count_cache_return, PPC_INST_BLR); + count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW; + pr_info("count-cache-flush: hardware assisted flush sequence enabled\n"); +} + +void setup_count_cache_flush(void) +{ + toggle_count_cache_flush(true); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS +static int count_cache_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) +{ + bool enable; + + if (val == 1) + enable = true; + else if (val == 0) + enable = false; + else + return -EINVAL; + + toggle_count_cache_flush(enable); + + return 0; +} + +static int count_cache_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) +{ + if (count_cache_flush_type == COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) + *val = 0; + else + *val = 1; + + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_count_cache_flush, count_cache_flush_get, + count_cache_flush_set, "%llu\n"); + +static __init int count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("count_cache_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, + NULL, &fops_count_cache_flush); + return 0; +} +device_initcall(count_cache_flush_debugfs_init); +#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_32.c index ad8c9db61237..cb37f27bb928 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_32.c @@ -322,6 +322,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) ppc_md.setup_arch(); if ( ppc_md.progress ) ppc_md.progress("arch: exit", 0x3eab); + setup_barrier_nospec(); + setup_spectre_v2(); + paging_init(); /* Initialize the MMU context management stuff */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c index 9eb469bed22b..11590f6cb2f9 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c @@ -736,6 +736,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) if (ppc_md.setup_arch) ppc_md.setup_arch(); + setup_barrier_nospec(); + setup_spectre_v2(); + paging_init(); /* Initialize the MMU context management stuff */ @@ -873,9 +876,6 @@ static void do_nothing(void *unused) void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable) { - if (rfi_flush == enable) - return; - if (enable) { do_rfi_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types); on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1); @@ -885,11 +885,15 @@ void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable) rfi_flush = enable; } -static void init_fallback_flush(void) +static void __ref init_fallback_flush(void) { u64 l1d_size, limit; int cpu; + /* Only allocate the fallback flush area once (at boot time). */ + if (l1d_flush_fallback_area) + return; + l1d_size = ppc64_caches.dsize; limit = min(safe_stack_limit(), ppc64_rma_size); @@ -902,34 +906,23 @@ static void init_fallback_flush(void) memset(l1d_flush_fallback_area, 0, l1d_size * 2); for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - /* - * The fallback flush is currently coded for 8-way - * associativity. Different associativity is possible, but it - * will be treated as 8-way and may not evict the lines as - * effectively. - * - * 128 byte lines are mandatory. - */ - u64 c = l1d_size / 8; - paca[cpu].rfi_flush_fallback_area = l1d_flush_fallback_area; - paca[cpu].l1d_flush_congruence = c; - paca[cpu].l1d_flush_sets = c / 128; + paca[cpu].l1d_flush_size = l1d_size; } } -void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) +void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) { if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) { - pr_info("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n"); + pr_info("rfi-flush: fallback displacement flush available\n"); init_fallback_flush(); } if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) - pr_info("rfi-flush: Using ori type flush\n"); + pr_info("rfi-flush: ori type flush available\n"); if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) - pr_info("rfi-flush: Using mttrig type flush\n"); + pr_info("rfi-flush: mttrig type flush available\n"); enabled_flush_types = types; @@ -940,13 +933,19 @@ void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) { + bool enable; + if (val == 1) - rfi_flush_enable(true); + enable = true; else if (val == 0) - rfi_flush_enable(false); + enable = false; else return -EINVAL; + /* Only do anything if we're changing state */ + if (enable != rfi_flush) + rfi_flush_enable(enable); + return 0; } @@ -965,12 +964,4 @@ static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void) } device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init); #endif - -ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) -{ - if (rfi_flush) - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: RFI Flush\n"); - - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); -} #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 30f90e8f5dd6..9f6d79714373 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -75,13 +75,44 @@ SECTIONS #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 . = ALIGN(8); + __stf_entry_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_entry_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .; + *(__stf_entry_barrier_fixup) + __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .; + } + + . = ALIGN(8); + __stf_exit_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .; + *(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup) + __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .; + } + + . = ALIGN(8); __rfi_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__rfi_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __start___rfi_flush_fixup = .; *(__rfi_flush_fixup) __stop___rfi_flush_fixup = .; } -#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC + . = ALIGN(8); + __spec_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__spec_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___barrier_nospec_fixup = .; + *(__barrier_nospec_fixup) + __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup = .; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E + . = ALIGN(8); + __spec_btb_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__spec_btb_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start__btb_flush_fixup = .; + *(__btb_flush_fixup) + __stop__btb_flush_fixup = .; + } +#endif EXCEPTION_TABLE(0) NOTES :kernel :notes |