diff options
| author | Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> | 2017-10-18 13:00:25 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Michael Bestas <mkbestas@lineageos.org> | 2022-04-19 00:51:16 +0300 |
| commit | 5dd97a8acaf41266d17eb2aa743f9e6dc6f5ffaf (patch) | |
| tree | 99d7d87b73f3ba2646d4b9369117cfd05441f135 | |
| parent | 6d6e905c034ae2c025f08a3ef16aaa214aec662f (diff) | |
UPSTREAM: selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry-pick from net-next: ec27c3568a34c7fe5fcf4ac0a354eda77687f7eb)
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: Ifb0cdd4b7d470223b143646b339ba511ac77c156
Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I073b5ebe76a280267289357af2b5d8f3afcaffa4
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 111 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 |
3 files changed, 117 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index df8e18de8512..3c85ed05b889 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -5927,6 +5928,106 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, + unsigned int size) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + int ret; + + switch (cmd) { + case BPF_MAP_CREATE: + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, + NULL); + break; + case BPF_PROG_LOAD: + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, + NULL); + break; + default: + ret = 0; + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) +{ + u32 av = 0; + + if (fmode & FMODE_READ) + av |= BPF__MAP_READ; + if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) + av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; + return av; +} + +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = map->security; + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bpfsec) + return -ENOMEM; + + bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); + map->security = bpfsec; + + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; + + map->security = NULL; + kfree(bpfsec); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bpfsec) + return -ENOMEM; + + bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); + aux->security = bpfsec; + + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; + + aux->security = NULL; + kfree(bpfsec); +} +#endif + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), @@ -6137,6 +6238,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free), +#endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 8a764f40730b..452851981cb8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } }, { "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer", NULL } }, + { "bpf", + { "map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run" } }, { "can_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { NULL } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index f6027d67a0e6..4c31ec14dd2c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ struct key_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of key */ }; +struct bpf_security_struct { + u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/ +}; + extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ |
