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* xen/x86: fix PV trap handling on secondary processorsJan Beulich2021-10-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0594c58161b6e0f3da8efa9c6e3d4ba52b652717 upstream. The initial observation was that in PV mode under Xen 32-bit user space didn't work anymore. Attempts of system calls ended in #GP(0x402). All of the sudden the vector 0x80 handler was not in place anymore. As it turns out up to 5.13 redundant initialization did occur: Once from cpu_initialize_context() (through its VCPUOP_initialise hypercall) and a 2nd time while each CPU was brought fully up. This 2nd initialization is now gone, uncovering that the 1st one was flawed: Unlike for the set_trap_table hypercall, a full virtual IDT needs to be specified here; the "vector" fields of the individual entries are of no interest. With many (kernel) IDT entries still(?) (i.e. at that point at least) empty, the syscall vector 0x80 ended up in slot 0x20 of the virtual IDT, thus becoming the domain's handler for vector 0x20. Make xen_convert_trap_info() fit for either purpose, leveraging the fact that on the xen_copy_trap_info() path the table starts out zero-filled. This includes moving out the writing of the sentinel, which would also have lead to a buffer overrun in the xen_copy_trap_info() case if all (kernel) IDT entries were populated. Convert the writing of the sentinel to clearing of the entire table entry rather than just the address field. (I didn't bother trying to identify the commit which uncovered the issue in 5.14; the commit named below is the one which actually introduced the bad code.) Fixes: f87e4cac4f4e ("xen: SMP guest support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7a266932-092e-b68f-f2bb-1473b61adc6e@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: fix setting of max_pfn in shared_infoJuergen Gross2021-09-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4b511d5bfa74b1926daefd1694205c7f1bcf677f upstream. Xen PV guests are specifying the highest used PFN via the max_pfn field in shared_info. This value is used by the Xen tools when saving or migrating the guest. Unfortunately this field is misnamed, as in reality it is specifying the number of pages (including any memory holes) of the guest, so it is the highest used PFN + 1. Renaming isn't possible, as this is a public Xen hypervisor interface which needs to be kept stable. The kernel will set the value correctly initially at boot time, but when adding more pages (e.g. due to memory hotplug or ballooning) a real PFN number is stored in max_pfn. This is done when expanding the p2m array, and the PFN stored there is even possibly wrong, as it should be the last possible PFN of the just added P2M frame, and not one which led to the P2M expansion. Fix that by setting shared_info->max_pfn to the last possible PFN + 1. Fixes: 98dd166ea3a3c3 ("x86/xen/p2m: hint at the last populated P2M entry") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210730092622.9973-2-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Xen/gnttab: handle p2m update errors on a per-slot basisJan Beulich2021-03-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8310b77b48c5558c140e7a57a702e7819e62f04e upstream. Bailing immediately from set_foreign_p2m_mapping() upon a p2m updating error leaves the full batch in an ambiguous state as far as the caller is concerned. Instead flags respective slots as bad, unmapping what was mapped there right away. HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op()'s return value and the individual unmap slots' status fields get used only for a one-time - there's not much we can do in case of a failure. Note that there's no GNTST_enomem or alike, so GNTST_general_error gets used. The map ops' handle fields get overwritten just to be on the safe side. This is part of XSA-367. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96cccf5d-e756-5f53-b91a-ea269bfb9be0@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Xen/x86: also check kernel mapping in set_foreign_p2m_mapping()Jan Beulich2021-02-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b512e1b077e5ccdbd6e225b15d934ab12453b70a upstream. We should not set up further state if either mapping failed; paying attention to just the user mapping's status isn't enough. Also use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero). This is part of XSA-361. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Xen/x86: don't bail early from clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()Jan Beulich2021-02-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a35f2ef3b7376bfd0a57f7844bd7454389aae1fc upstream. Its sibling (set_foreign_p2m_mapping()) as well as the sibling of its only caller (gnttab_map_refs()) don't clean up after themselves in case of error. Higher level callers are expected to do so. However, in order for that to really clean up any partially set up state, the operation should not terminate upon encountering an entry in unexpected state. It is particularly relevant to notice here that set_foreign_p2m_mapping() would skip setting up a p2m entry if its grant mapping failed, but it would continue to set up further p2m entries as long as their mappings succeeded. Arguably down the road set_foreign_p2m_mapping() may want its page state related WARN_ON() also converted to an error return. This is part of XSA-361. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: don't unbind uninitialized lock_kicker_irqBrian Masney2020-12-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 65cae18882f943215d0505ddc7e70495877308e6 ] When booting a hyperthreaded system with the kernel parameter 'mitigations=auto,nosmt', the following warning occurs: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:1112 unbind_from_irqhandler+0x4e/0x60 ... Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 08/24/2006 ... Call Trace: xen_uninit_lock_cpu+0x28/0x62 xen_hvm_cpu_die+0x21/0x30 takedown_cpu+0x9c/0xe0 ? trace_suspend_resume+0x60/0x60 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9a/0x530 _cpu_up+0x11a/0x130 cpu_up+0x7e/0xc0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x48/0x50 smp_init+0x26/0x79 kernel_init_freeable+0xea/0x229 ? rest_init+0xaa/0xaa kernel_init+0xa/0x106 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The secondary CPUs are not activated with the nosmt mitigations and only the primary thread on each CPU core is used. In this situation, xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus(), and more importantly xen_init_lock_cpu(), is not called, so the lock_kicker_irq is not initialized for the secondary CPUs. Let's fix this by exiting early in xen_uninit_lock_cpu() if the irq is not set to avoid the warning from above for each secondary CPU. Signed-off-by: Brian Masney <bmasney@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201107011119.631442-1-bmasney@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third tryBorislav Petkov2020-05-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a9a3ed1eff3601b63aea4fb462d8b3b92c7c1e7e upstream. ... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the function which generates the stack canary value. The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel built with gcc-10: Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013 Call Trace: dump_stack panic ? start_secondary __stack_chk_fail start_secondary secondary_startup_64 -—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the boot_init_stack_canary() call. To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which generates the stack canary with: __attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused) however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options. The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs. The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with -fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm(""). This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?) optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the compiler cannot ignore or move around etc. That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other two solutions too so... Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/paravirt: Remove the unused irq_enable_sysexit pv opBoris Ostrovsky2020-05-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 88c15ec90ff16880efab92b519436ee17b198477 upstream. As result of commit "x86/xen: Avoid fast syscall path for Xen PV guests", the irq_enable_sysexit pv op is not called by Xen PV guests anymore and since they were the only ones who used it we can safely remove it. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1447970147-1733-3-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: fix xen_qlock_wait()Juergen Gross2018-11-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d3132b3860f6cf35ff7609a76bbcdbb814bd027c upstream. Commit a856531951dc80 ("xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestable") introduced a regression for Xen guests running fully virtualized (HVM or PVH mode). The Xen hypervisor wouldn't return from the poll hypercall with interrupts disabled in case of an interrupt (for PV guests it does). So instead of disabling interrupts in xen_qlock_wait() use a nesting counter to avoid calling xen_clear_irq_pending() in case xen_qlock_wait() is nested. Fixes: a856531951dc80 ("xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestable") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestableJuergen Gross2018-11-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a856531951dc8094359dfdac21d59cee5969c18e upstream. xen_qlock_wait() isn't safe for nested calls due to interrupts. A call of xen_qlock_kick() might be ignored in case a deeper nesting level was active right before the call of xen_poll_irq(): CPU 1: CPU 2: spin_lock(lock1) spin_lock(lock1) -> xen_qlock_wait() -> xen_clear_irq_pending() Interrupt happens spin_unlock(lock1) -> xen_qlock_kick(CPU 2) spin_lock_irqsave(lock2) spin_lock_irqsave(lock2) -> xen_qlock_wait() -> xen_clear_irq_pending() clears kick for lock1 -> xen_poll_irq() spin_unlock_irq_restore(lock2) -> xen_qlock_kick(CPU 2) wakes up spin_unlock_irq_restore(lock2) IRET resumes in xen_qlock_wait() -> xen_poll_irq() never wakes up The solution is to disable interrupts in xen_qlock_wait() and not to poll for the irq in case xen_qlock_wait() is called in nmi context. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Waiman.Long@hp.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: fix race in xen_qlock_wait()Juergen Gross2018-11-21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2ac2a7d4d9ff4e01e36f9c3d116582f6f655ab47 upstream. In the following situation a vcpu waiting for a lock might not be woken up from xen_poll_irq(): CPU 1: CPU 2: CPU 3: takes a spinlock tries to get lock -> xen_qlock_wait() frees the lock -> xen_qlock_kick(cpu2) -> xen_clear_irq_pending() takes lock again tries to get lock -> *lock = _Q_SLOW_VAL -> *lock == _Q_SLOW_VAL ? -> xen_poll_irq() frees the lock -> xen_qlock_kick(cpu3) And cpu 2 will sleep forever. This can be avoided easily by modifying xen_qlock_wait() to call xen_poll_irq() only if the related irq was not pending and to call xen_clear_irq_pending() only if it was pending. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Waiman.Long@hp.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen/x86/vpmu: Zero struct pt_regs before calling into sample handling codeBoris Ostrovsky2018-09-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 70513d58751d7c6c1a0133557b13089b9f2e3e66 upstream. Otherwise we may leak kernel stack for events that sample user registers. Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: Add call of speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to PV pathsJuergen Gross2018-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 74899d92e66663dc7671a8017b3146dcd4735f3b upstream. Commit: 1f50ddb4f418 ("x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD") ... added speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to the per-CPU initialization sequence. speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() needs to be called on each CPU for PV guests, too. Reported-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com> Tested-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Fixes: 1f50ddb4f4189243c05926b842dc1a0332195f31 ("x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180621084331.21228-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under XenDavid Woodhouse2018-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit def9331a12977770cc6132d79f8e6565871e8e38 upstream When running as Xen pv guest X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS must not be set on AMD cpus. This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using setup_clear_cpu_cap() instead of the hypervisor's set_cpu_features callback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem. The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()Juergen Gross2018-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Upstream commit: 0808e80cb760de2733c0527d2090ed2205a1eef8 ("xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()") There is no need to set the same capabilities for each cpu individually. This can easily be done for all cpus when starting the kernel. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: Zero MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL before suspendJuergen Gross2018-07-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 71c208dd54ab971036d83ff6d9837bae4976e623 upstream. Older Xen versions (4.5 and before) might have problems migrating pv guests with MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL having a non-zero value. So before suspending zero that MSR and restore it after being resumed. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226140818.4849-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events ↵Steven Rostedt (VMware)2018-05-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} commit 45dd9b0666a162f8e4be76096716670cf1741f0e upstream. Doing an audit of trace events, I discovered two trace events in the xen subsystem that use a hack to create zero data size trace events. This is not what trace events are for. Trace events add memory footprint overhead, and if all you need to do is see if a function is hit or not, simply make that function noinline and use function tracer filtering. Worse yet, the hack used was: __array(char, x, 0) Which creates a static string of zero in length. There's assumptions about such constructs in ftrace that this is a dynamic string that is nul terminated. This is not the case with these tracepoints and can cause problems in various parts of ftrace. Nuke the trace events! Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509144605.5a220327@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 95a7d76897c1e ("xen/mmu: Use Xen specific TLB flush instead of the generic one.") Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Enable CR4.PCIDE on supported systemsAndy Lutomirski2018-01-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 660da7c9228f685b2ebe664f9fd69aaddcc420b5 upstream. We can use PCID if the CPU has PCID and PGE and we're not on Xen. By itself, this has no effect. A followup patch will start using PCID. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6327ecd907b32f79d5aa0d466f04503bbec5df88.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: adjust early dom0 p2m handling to xen hypervisor behaviorJuergen Gross2017-05-20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 69861e0a52f8733355ce246f0db15e1b240ad667 upstream. When booted as pv-guest the p2m list presented by the Xen is already mapped to virtual addresses. In dom0 case the hypervisor might make use of 2M- or 1G-pages for this mapping. Unfortunately while being properly aligned in virtual and machine address space, those pages might not be aligned properly in guest physical address space. So when trying to obtain the guest physical address of such a page pud_pfn() and pmd_pfn() must be avoided as those will mask away guest physical address bits not being zero in this special case. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen/x86: don't lose event interruptsStefano Stabellini2017-05-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c06b6d70feb32d28f04ba37aa3df17973fd37b6b upstream. On slow platforms with unreliable TSC, such as QEMU emulated machines, it is possible for the kernel to request the next event in the past. In that case, in the current implementation of xen_vcpuop_clockevent, we simply return -ETIME. To be precise the Xen returns -ETIME and we pass it on. However the result of this is a missed event, which simply causes the kernel to hang. Instead it is better to always ask the hypervisor for a timer event, even if the timeout is in the past. That way there are no lost interrupts and the kernel survives. To do that, remove the VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future flag. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen/setup: Don't relocate p2m over existing oneRoss Lagerwall2017-04-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7ecec8503af37de6be4f96b53828d640a968705f upstream. When relocating the p2m, take special care not to relocate it so that is overlaps with the current location of the p2m/initrd. This is needed since the full extent of the current location is not marked as a reserved region in the e820. This was seen to happen to a dom0 with a large initial p2m and a small reserved region in the middle of the initial p2m. Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen/qspinlock: Don't kick CPU if IRQ is not initializedRoss Lagerwall2017-03-26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 707e59ba494372a90d245f18b0c78982caa88e48 upstream. The following commit: 1fb3a8b2cfb2 ("xen/spinlock: Fix locking path engaging too soon under PVHVM.") ... moved the initalization of the kicker interrupt until after native_cpu_up() is called. However, when using qspinlocks, a CPU may try to kick another CPU that is spinning (because it has not yet initialized its kicker interrupt), resulting in the following crash during boot: kernel BUG at /build/linux-Ay7j_C/linux-4.4.0/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:1210! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814c97c9>] [<ffffffff814c97c9>] xen_send_IPI_one+0x59/0x60 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8102be9e>] xen_qlock_kick+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff810cabc2>] __pv_queued_spin_unlock+0xb2/0xf0 [<ffffffff810ca6d1>] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20 [<ffffffff81052936>] ? check_tsc_warp+0x76/0x150 [<ffffffff81052aa6>] check_tsc_sync_source+0x96/0x160 [<ffffffff81051e28>] native_cpu_up+0x3d8/0x9f0 [<ffffffff8102b315>] xen_hvm_cpu_up+0x35/0x80 [<ffffffff8108198c>] _cpu_up+0x13c/0x180 [<ffffffff81081a4a>] cpu_up+0x7a/0xa0 [<ffffffff81f80dfc>] smp_init+0x7f/0x81 [<ffffffff81f5a121>] kernel_init_freeable+0xef/0x212 [<ffffffff81817f30>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff81817f3e>] kernel_init+0xe/0xe0 [<ffffffff8182488f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff81817f30>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 To fix this, only send the kick if the target CPU's interrupt has been initialized. This check isn't racy, because the target is waiting for the spinlock, so it won't have initialized the interrupt in the meantime. Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: fix upper bound of pmd loop in xen_cleanhighmap()Juergen Gross2016-11-10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1cf38741308c64d08553602b3374fb39224eeb5a upstream. xen_cleanhighmap() is operating on level2_kernel_pgt only. The upper bound of the loop setting non-kernel-image entries to zero should not exceed the size of level2_kernel_pgt. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen, pat: Remove PAT table init code from XenToshi Kani2016-08-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 88ba281108ed0c25c9d292b48bd3f272fcb90dd0 upstream. Xen supports PAT without MTRRs for its guests. In order to enable WC attribute, it was necessary for xen_start_kernel() to call pat_init_cache_modes() to update PAT table before starting guest kernel. Now that the kernel initializes PAT table to the BIOS handoff state when MTRR is disabled, this Xen-specific PAT init code is no longer necessary. Delete it from xen_start_kernel(). Also change __init_cache_modes() to a static function since PAT table should not be tweaked by other modules. Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: elliott@hpe.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-7-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm/pat: Add support of non-default PAT MSR settingToshi Kani2016-08-16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 02f037d641dc6672be5cfe7875a48ab99b95b154 upstream. In preparation for fixing a regression caused by: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")' ... PAT needs to support a case that PAT MSR is initialized with a non-default value. When pat_init() is called and PAT is disabled, it initializes the PAT table with the BIOS default value. Xen, however, sets PAT MSR with a non-default value to enable WC. This causes inconsistency between the PAT table and PAT MSR when PAT is set to disable on Xen. Change pat_init() to handle the PAT disable cases properly. Add init_cache_modes() to handle two cases when PAT is set to disable. 1. CPU supports PAT: Set PAT table to be consistent with PAT MSR. 2. CPU does not support PAT: Set PAT table to be consistent with PWT and PCD bits in a PTE. Note, __init_cache_modes(), renamed from pat_init_cache_modes(), will be changed to a static function in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: elliott@hpe.com Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-2-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xen: use same main loop for counting and remapping pagesJuergen Gross2016-06-07
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit dd14be92fbf5bc1ef7343f34968440e44e21b46a upstream. Instead of having two functions for cycling through the E820 map in order to count to be remapped pages and remap them later, just use one function with a caller supplied sub-function called for each region to be processed. This eliminates the possibility of a mismatch between both loops which showed up in certain configurations. Suggested-by: Ed Swierk <eswierk@skyportsystems.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/iopl/64: Properly context-switch IOPL on Xen PVAndy Lutomirski2016-04-12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b7a584598aea7ca73140cb87b40319944dd3393f upstream. On Xen PV, regs->flags doesn't reliably reflect IOPL and the exit-to-userspace code doesn't change IOPL. We need to context switch it manually. I'm doing this without going through paravirt because this is specific to Xen PV. After the dust settles, we can merge this with the 32-bit code, tidy up the iopl syscall implementation, and remove the set_iopl pvop entirely. Fixes XSA-171. Reviewewd-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/693c3bd7aeb4d3c27c92c622b7d0f554a458173c.1458162709.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: don't reset vcpu_info on a cancelled suspendOuyang Zhaowei (Charles)2016-01-31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6a1f513776b78c994045287073e55bae44ed9f8c upstream. On a cancelled suspend the vcpu_info location does not change (it's still in the per-cpu area registered by xen_vcpu_setup()). So do not call xen_hvm_init_shared_info() which would make the kernel think its back in the shared info. With the wrong vcpu_info, events cannot be received and the domain will hang after a cancelled suspend. Signed-off-by: Charles Ouyang <ouyangzhaowei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-08
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "A handful of x86 fixes: - a syscall ABI fix, fixing an Android breakage - a Xen PV guest fix relating to the RTC device, causing a non-working console - a Xen guest syscall stack frame fix - an MCE hotplug CPU crash fix" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/numachip: Fix NumaConnect2 MMCFG PCI access x86/entry: Restore traditional SYSENTER calling convention x86/entry: Fix some comments x86/paravirt: Prevent rtc_cmos platform device init on PV guests x86/xen: Avoid fast syscall path for Xen PV guests x86/mce: Ensure offline CPUs don't participate in rendezvous process
| * x86/paravirt: Prevent rtc_cmos platform device init on PV guestsDavid Vrabel2015-12-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding the rtc platform device in non-privileged Xen PV guests causes an IRQ conflict because these guests do not have legacy PIC and may allocate irqs in the legacy range. In a single VCPU Xen PV guest we should have: /proc/interrupts: CPU0 0: 4934 xen-percpu-virq timer0 1: 0 xen-percpu-ipi spinlock0 2: 0 xen-percpu-ipi resched0 3: 0 xen-percpu-ipi callfunc0 4: 0 xen-percpu-virq debug0 5: 0 xen-percpu-ipi callfuncsingle0 6: 0 xen-percpu-ipi irqwork0 7: 321 xen-dyn-event xenbus 8: 90 xen-dyn-event hvc_console ... But hvc_console cannot get its interrupt because it is already in use by rtc0 and the console does not work. genirq: Flags mismatch irq 8. 00000000 (hvc_console) vs. 00000000 (rtc0) We can avoid this problem by realizing that unprivileged PV guests (both Xen and lguests) are not supposed to have rtc_cmos device and so adding it is not necessary. Privileged guests (i.e. Xen's dom0) do use it but they should not have irq conflicts since they allocate irqs above legacy range (above gsi_top, in fact). Instead of explicitly testing whether the guest is privileged we can extend pv_info structure to include information about guest's RTC support. Reported-and-tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: vkuznets@redhat.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449842873-2613-1-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
| * x86/xen: Avoid fast syscall path for Xen PV guestsBoris Ostrovsky2015-12-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After 32-bit syscall rewrite, and specifically after commit: 5f310f739b4c ("x86/entry/32: Re-implement SYSENTER using the new C path") ... the stack frame that is passed to xen_sysexit is no longer a "standard" one (i.e. it's not pt_regs). Since we end up calling xen_iret from xen_sysexit we don't need to fix up the stack and instead follow entry_SYSENTER_32's IRET path directly to xen_iret. We can do the same thing for compat mode even though stack does not need to be fixed. This will allow us to drop usergs_sysret32 paravirt op (in the subsequent patch) Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1447970147-1733-2-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | arch/x86/xen/suspend.c: include xen/xen.hAndrew Morton2015-12-29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the build warning: arch/x86/xen/suspend.c: In function 'xen_arch_pre_suspend': arch/x86/xen/suspend.c:70:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'xen_pv_domain' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] if (xen_pv_domain()) ^ Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge tag 'for-linus-4.4-rc5-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-12-18
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen bug fixes from David Vrabel: - XSA-155 security fixes to backend drivers. - XSA-157 security fixes to pciback. * tag 'for-linus-4.4-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen-pciback: fix up cleanup path when alloc fails xen/pciback: Don't allow MSI-X ops if PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY is not set. xen/pciback: For XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x] only disable if device has MSI(X) enabled. xen/pciback: Do not install an IRQ handler for MSI interrupts. xen/pciback: Return error on XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix when device has MSI or MSI-X enabled xen/pciback: Return error on XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi when device has MSI or MSI-X enabled xen/pciback: Save xen_pci_op commands before processing it xen-scsiback: safely copy requests xen-blkback: read from indirect descriptors only once xen-blkback: only read request operation from shared ring once xen-netback: use RING_COPY_REQUEST() throughout xen-netback: don't use last request to determine minimum Tx credit xen: Add RING_COPY_REQUEST() xen/x86/pvh: Use HVM's flush_tlb_others op xen: Resume PMU from non-atomic context xen/events/fifo: Consume unprocessed events when a CPU dies
| * xen/x86/pvh: Use HVM's flush_tlb_others opBoris Ostrovsky2015-12-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Using MMUEXT_TLB_FLUSH_MULTI doesn't buy us much since the hypervisor will likely perform same IPIs as would have the guest. More importantly, using MMUEXT_INVLPG_MULTI may not to invalidate the guest's address on remote CPU (when, for example, VCPU from another guest is running there). Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
| * xen: Resume PMU from non-atomic contextBoris Ostrovsky2015-12-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Resuming PMU currently triggers a warning from ___might_sleep() (assuming CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is set) when xen_pmu_init() allocates GFP_KERNEL page because we are in state resembling atomic context. Move resuming PMU to xen_arch_resume() which is called in regular context. For symmetry move suspending PMU to xen_arch_suspend() as well. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reported-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.3 Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
* | Merge tag 'for-linus-4.4-rc0-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-04
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen updates from David Vrabel: - Improve balloon driver memory hotplug placement. - Use unpopulated hotplugged memory for foreign pages (if supported/enabled). - Support 64 KiB guest pages on arm64. - CPU hotplug support on arm/arm64. * tag 'for-linus-4.4-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: (44 commits) xen: fix the check of e_pfn in xen_find_pfn_range x86/xen: add reschedule point when mapping foreign GFNs xen/arm: don't try to re-register vcpu_info on cpu_hotplug. xen, cpu_hotplug: call device_offline instead of cpu_down xen/arm: Enable cpu_hotplug.c xenbus: Support multiple grants ring with 64KB xen/grant-table: Add an helper to iterate over a specific number of grants xen/xenbus: Rename *RING_PAGE* to *RING_GRANT* xen/arm: correct comment in enlighten.c xen/gntdev: use types from linux/types.h in userspace headers xen/gntalloc: use types from linux/types.h in userspace headers xen/balloon: Use the correct sizeof when declaring frame_list xen/swiotlb: Add support for 64KB page granularity xen/swiotlb: Pass addresses rather than frame numbers to xen_arch_need_swiotlb arm/xen: Add support for 64KB page granularity xen/privcmd: Add support for Linux 64KB page granularity net/xen-netback: Make it running on 64KB page granularity net/xen-netfront: Make it running on 64KB page granularity block/xen-blkback: Make it running on 64KB page granularity block/xen-blkfront: Make it running on 64KB page granularity ...
| * xen: fix the check of e_pfn in xen_find_pfn_rangeZhenzhong Duan2015-11-02
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On some NUMA system, after dom0 up, we see below warning even if there are enough pfn ranges that could be used for remapping: "Unable to find available pfn range, not remapping identity pages" Fix it to avoid getting a memory region of zero size in xen_find_pfn_range. Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
| * x86/xen: add reschedule point when mapping foreign GFNsDavid Vrabel2015-10-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mapping a large range of foreign GFNs can take a long time, add a reschedule point after each batch of 16 GFNs. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
| * xen/arm: Enable cpu_hotplug.cStefano Stabellini2015-10-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Build cpu_hotplug for ARM and ARM64 guests. Rename arch_(un)register_cpu to xen_(un)register_cpu and provide an empty implementation on ARM and ARM64. On x86 just call arch_(un)register_cpu as we are already doing. Initialize cpu_hotplug on ARM. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
| * x86/xen: export xen_alloc_p2m_entry()David Vrabel2015-10-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename alloc_p2m() to xen_alloc_p2m_entry() and export it. This is useful for ensuring that a p2m entry is allocated (i.e., not a shared missing or identity entry) so that subsequent set_phys_to_machine() calls will require no further allocations. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> --- v3: - Make xen_alloc_p2m_entry() a nop on auto-xlate guests.
| * xen/balloon: make alloc_xenballoon_pages() always allocate low pagesDavid Vrabel2015-10-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All users of alloc_xenballoon_pages() wanted low memory pages, so remove the option for high memory. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
| * x86/xen: discard RAM regions above the maximum reservationDavid Vrabel2015-10-23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During setup, discard RAM regions that are above the maximum reservation (instead of marking them as E820_UNUSABLE). This allows hotplug memory to be placed at these addresses. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
* | x86/vdso: Remove runtime 32-bit vDSO selectionAndy Lutomirski2015-10-07
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 32-bit userspace will now always see the same vDSO, which is exactly what used to be the int80 vDSO. Subsequent patches will clean it up and make it support SYSENTER and SYSCALL using alternatives. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e7e6b3526fa442502e6125fe69486aab50813c32.1444091584.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* x86/xen/p2m: hint at the last populated P2M entryDavid Vrabel2015-10-06
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With commit 633d6f17cd91ad5bf2370265946f716e42d388c6 (x86/xen: prepare p2m list for memory hotplug) the P2M may be sized to accomdate a much larger amount of memory than the domain currently has. When saving a domain, the toolstack must scan all the P2M looking for populated pages. This results in a performance regression due to the unnecessary scanning. Instead of reporting (via shared_info) the maximum possible size of the P2M, hint at the last PFN which might be populated. This hint is increased as new leaves are added to the P2M (in the expectation that they will be used for populated entries). Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
* x86/xen: Do not clip xen_e820_map to xen_e820_map_entries when sanitizing mapMalcolm Crossley2015-09-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sanitizing the e820 map may produce extra E820 entries which would result in the topmost E820 entries being removed. The removed entries would typically include the top E820 usable RAM region and thus result in the domain having signicantly less RAM available to it. Fix by allowing sanitize_e820_map to use the full size of the allocated E820 array. Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
* x86/xen: Support kexec/kdump in HVM guests by doing a soft resetVitaly Kuznetsov2015-09-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently there is a number of issues preventing PVHVM Xen guests from doing successful kexec/kdump: - Bound event channels. - Registered vcpu_info. - PIRQ/emuirq mappings. - shared_info frame after XENMAPSPACE_shared_info operation. - Active grant mappings. Basically, newly booted kernel stumbles upon already set up Xen interfaces and there is no way to reestablish them. In Xen-4.7 a new feature called 'soft reset' is coming. A guest performing kexec/kdump operation is supposed to call SCHEDOP_shutdown hypercall with SHUTDOWN_soft_reset reason before jumping to new kernel. Hypervisor (with some help from toolstack) will do full domain cleanup (but keeping its memory and vCPU contexts intact) returning the guest to the state it had when it was first booted and thus allowing it to start over. Doing SHUTDOWN_soft_reset on Xen hypervisors which don't support it is probably OK as by default all unknown shutdown reasons cause domain destroy with a message in toolstack log: 'Unknown shutdown reason code 5. Destroying domain.' which gives a clue to what the problem is and eliminates false expectations. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
* xen/x86: Don't try to write syscall-related MSRs for PV guestsBoris Ostrovsky2015-09-28
| | | | | | | | | | | For PV guests these registers are set up by hypervisor and thus should not be written by the guest. The comment in xen_write_msr_safe() says so but we still write the MSRs, causing the hypervisor to print a warning. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
* xen: use correct type for HYPERVISOR_memory_op()Juergen Gross2015-09-28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | HYPERVISOR_memory_op() is defined to return an "int" value. This is wrong, as the Xen hypervisor will return "long". The sub-function XENMEM_maximum_reservation returns the maximum number of pages for the current domain. An int will overflow for a domain configured with 8TB of memory or more. Correct this by using the correct type. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
* Merge tag 'for-linus-4.3-rc0b-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-09-10
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen terminology fixes from David Vrabel: "Use the correct GFN/BFN terms more consistently" * tag 'for-linus-4.3-rc0b-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen/xenbus: Rename the variable xen_store_mfn to xen_store_gfn xen/privcmd: Further s/MFN/GFN/ clean-up hvc/xen: Further s/MFN/GFN clean-up video/xen-fbfront: Further s/MFN/GFN clean-up xen/tmem: Use xen_page_to_gfn rather than pfn_to_gfn xen: Use correctly the Xen memory terminologies arm/xen: implement correctly pfn_to_mfn xen: Make clear that swiotlb and biomerge are dealing with DMA address
| * xen/privcmd: Further s/MFN/GFN/ clean-upJulien Grall2015-09-08
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The privcmd code is mixing the usage of GFN and MFN within the same functions which make the code difficult to understand when you only work with auto-translated guests. The privcmd driver is only dealing with GFN so replace all the mention of MFN into GFN. The ioctl structure used to map foreign change has been left unchanged given that the userspace is using it. Nonetheless, add a comment to explain the expected value within the "mfn" field. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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