diff options
| author | Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> | 2016-01-07 16:07:20 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2016-05-04 14:48:42 -0700 |
| commit | bdb0618ad1b9ea6ec6926450c687d133ccddf28c (patch) | |
| tree | 8722bdb65a0b1989f9ac67cc613c98fd65e30cb8 /tools/perf/scripts/python/bin | |
| parent | c0944355a74bc9c2b5b3cc5b627efe0c73e30bd9 (diff) | |
arm64: Honour !PTE_WRITE in set_pte_at() for kernel mappings
commit ac15bd63bbb24238f763ec5b24ee175ec301e8cd upstream.
Currently, set_pte_at() only checks the software PTE_WRITE bit for user
mappings when it sets or clears the hardware PTE_RDONLY accordingly. The
kernel ptes are written directly without any modification, relying
solely on the protection bits in macros like PAGE_KERNEL. However,
modifying kernel pte attributes via pte_wrprotect() would be ignored by
set_pte_at(). Since pte_wrprotect() does not set PTE_RDONLY (it only
clears PTE_WRITE), the new permission is not taken into account.
This patch changes set_pte_at() to adjust the read-only permission for
kernel ptes as well. As a side effect, existing PROT_* definitions used
for kernel ioremap*() need to include PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE.
(additionally, white space fix for PTE_KERNEL_ROX)
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python/bin')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
