diff options
| author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-12-18 11:52:16 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-01-13 10:05:29 +0100 |
| commit | e8ed54c8c379da0fdf8ae04b7e45fd8367fe0f2e (patch) | |
| tree | 9bdd55d3b467633f78711e9f184f9ff6a1add2d1 /scripts | |
| parent | 8286dcc1d7aa46543ea3d11ce84c24965576193b (diff) | |
ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
commit 5ae4f61f012a097df93de2285070ec8e34716d29 upstream.
ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions