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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-12-19 18:00:15 -0600
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2019-01-13 10:05:27 +0100
commita2a840d6dcae960c2dfdf3fcb1b759e1b7d90663 (patch)
tree25806aba35da96db0eb4c0cafd26510c20716a05 /scripts/objdiff
parent38b1b66e5796cc9089c02720b78d50d0682e66b0 (diff)
drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
commit 505b5240329b922f21f91d5b5d1e535c805eca6d upstream. nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r] drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls and drm_ioctls. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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