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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-10-16 15:06:41 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-11-10 07:41:42 -0800
commit3700bfc36c3cef29533951d31b37b041628bb5b2 (patch)
tree576a66f26dcf08a555c984ff5a6dd5d2e60889e5 /net/unix/af_unix.c
parentd1ce094c3c90434844c6580be7290517762422d6 (diff)
ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
commit efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba upstream. pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index info->pin_config. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions