diff options
| author | Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@chromium.org> | 2016-10-06 15:53:38 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Bruno Martins <bgcngm@gmail.com> | 2024-01-10 15:40:04 +0000 |
| commit | a3591a235c89dbc2e0bc03533fb538f6d2aa883b (patch) | |
| tree | 4ac4c45b2e5a48343c29b6b74371590adf9f3558 /kernel | |
| parent | 5e0c41643bbb4d0290ac383f45fdaf684a907f74 (diff) | |
CHROMIUM: remove Android's cgroup generic permissions checks
The implementation is utterly broken, resulting in all processes being
allows to move tasks between sets (as long as they have access to the
"tasks" attribute), and upstream is heading towards checking only
capability anyway, so let's get rid of this code.
BUG=b:31790445,chromium:647994
TEST=Boot android container, examine logcat
Change-Id: I2f780a5992c34e52a8f2d0b3557fc9d490da2779
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/394967
Reviewed-by: Ricky Zhou <rickyz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/cgroup.c | 57 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index c2508ca442b7..64a3b3db2484 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -2848,44 +2848,6 @@ static int cgroup_attach_task(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, return ret; } -int subsys_cgroup_allow_attach(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, struct cgroup_taskset *tset) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; - struct task_struct *task; - - if (capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) - return 0; - - cgroup_taskset_for_each(task, css, tset) { - tcred = __task_cred(task); - - if (current != task && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) && - !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid)) - return -EACCES; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int cgroup_allow_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cgroup_taskset *tset) -{ - struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; - int i; - int ret; - - for_each_css(css, i, cgrp) { - if (css->ss->allow_attach) { - ret = css->ss->allow_attach(css, tset); - if (ret) - return ret; - } else { - return -EACCES; - } - } - - return 0; -} - static int cgroup_procs_write_permission(struct task_struct *task, struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, struct kernfs_open_file *of) @@ -2901,23 +2863,8 @@ static int cgroup_procs_write_permission(struct task_struct *task, if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && - !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) { - /* - * if the default permission check fails, give each - * cgroup a chance to extend the permission check - */ - struct cgroup_taskset tset = { - .src_csets = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tset.src_csets), - .dst_csets = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tset.dst_csets), - .csets = &tset.src_csets, - }; - struct css_set *cset; - cset = task_css_set(task); - list_add(&cset->mg_node, &tset.src_csets); - ret = cgroup_allow_attach(dst_cgrp, &tset); - if (ret) - ret = -EACCES; - } + !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) + ret = -EACCES; if (!ret && cgroup_on_dfl(dst_cgrp)) { struct super_block *sb = of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb; |