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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-05-25 14:47:57 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-05-30 07:48:51 +0200
commit34dedd5d7bb9f5e798a0d4ab882a64e8b8a9720f (patch)
tree6dedc3082185ad6b255ba89d638eb1b63d4858f9 /include/linux
parente6b2c060e0dfa8fc841feae5c9383fa96e5dc4ac (diff)
kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue
commit 23d6aef74da86a33fa6bb75f79565e0a16ee97c2 upstream. `resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index current->signal->rlim Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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