diff options
| author | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> | 2017-09-07 08:30:44 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> | 2018-09-21 14:51:49 -0700 |
| commit | 1a0df285e47623996c2879ee2507a70730c5e0dc (patch) | |
| tree | 2c3c30b2a4fcdb7121b121159312e454c3ec3569 /include/linux | |
| parent | 67e53dac92e798fc52fddd4634d0b1be259861ad (diff) | |
UPSTREAM: syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check
(cherry-picked from bf29ed1567b67854dc13504f685c45a2ea9b2081)
Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION instead of BUG_ON to provide more flexibility
on address limit failures. By default, send a SIGKILL signal to kill the
current process preventing exploitation of a bad address limit.
Make the TIF_FSCHECK flag optional so ARM can use this function.
Change-Id: I02b39760aaa794db77de7b0c0b1b0ec66abe1cb1
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1504798247-48833-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/syscalls.h | 12 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index a95cb2589765..5d2779aa4bbe 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -205,21 +205,25 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs; } \ static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) -#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK /* * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory. */ static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void) { - +#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK)) return; +#endif - BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)); + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS), + "Invalid address limit on user-mode return")) + force_sig(SIGKILL, current); + +#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK clear_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK); -} #endif +} asmlinkage long sys32_quotactl(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *special, qid_t id, void __user *addr); |