diff options
| author | Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> | 2018-07-14 02:37:21 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-07-25 10:18:28 +0200 |
| commit | 6e2119e4b8767a6c3a415875ad09596ada00755c (patch) | |
| tree | 1176b22e1bf5107c3901445ae6bd6eec62cb9d02 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | |
| parent | afc6bf9131efc36d4ae8a003e8597119a2190661 (diff) | |
x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
commit 9f65fb29374ee37856dbad847b4e121aab72b510 upstream
Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).
Hence changing it.
It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.
Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.
[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.4.y, skipping the KVM changes in this patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 36 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 6fd3fcf680bf..812e92a49216 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; /* * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. - * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). + * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). */ u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base; -u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; +u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask; void __init check_bugs(void) { @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void) u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base; if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) - msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); + msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); return msrval; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default); @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) return; if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) - host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); + host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl); @@ -172,18 +172,18 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) return; if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) - host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); + host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host); -static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void) +static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void) { - u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; + u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask; - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval); } @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE; enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd; - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS)) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) return mode; cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline(); @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. - * - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass + * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass * - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation */ if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) { @@ -516,12 +516,12 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) */ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) { case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: - x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS; - x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS; - x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS); + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; + x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; + x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD); break; case X86_VENDOR_AMD: - x86_amd_rds_enable(); + x86_amd_ssb_disable(); break; } } @@ -554,16 +554,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) return -EPERM; task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task); - update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS); + update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); break; case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); - update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS); + update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); break; case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task); - update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS); + update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); break; default: return -ERANGE; @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) - x86_amd_rds_enable(); + x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS |
