From 0e367ae46503cfe7791460c8ba8434a5d60b2bd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Vrabel Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 17:32:01 +0000 Subject: xen/blkback: correctly respond to unknown, non-native requests If the frontend is using a non-native protocol (e.g., a 64-bit frontend with a 32-bit backend) and it sent an unrecognized request, the request was not translated and the response would have the incorrect ID. This may cause the frontend driver to behave incorrectly or crash. Since the ID field in the request is always in the same place, regardless of the request type we can get the correct ID and make a valid response (which will report BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP). This bug affected 64-bit SLES 11 guests when using a 32-bit backend. This guest does a BLKIF_OP_RESERVED_1 (BLKIF_OP_PACKET in the SLES source) and would crash in blkif_int() as the ID in the response would be invalid. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- include/xen/interface/io/blkif.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/blkif.h b/include/xen/interface/io/blkif.h index 01c3d62436ef..ffd4652de91c 100644 --- a/include/xen/interface/io/blkif.h +++ b/include/xen/interface/io/blkif.h @@ -138,11 +138,21 @@ struct blkif_request_discard { uint8_t _pad3; } __attribute__((__packed__)); +struct blkif_request_other { + uint8_t _pad1; + blkif_vdev_t _pad2; /* only for read/write requests */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + uint32_t _pad3; /* offsetof(blkif_req..,u.other.id)==8*/ +#endif + uint64_t id; /* private guest value, echoed in resp */ +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + struct blkif_request { uint8_t operation; /* BLKIF_OP_??? */ union { struct blkif_request_rw rw; struct blkif_request_discard discard; + struct blkif_request_other other; } u; } __attribute__((__packed__)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0ec83bd2460ed6aed0e7f29f9e0633b054621c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chanwoo Choi Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 17:38:57 +0900 Subject: extcon: max77693: Initialize register of MUIC device to bring up it without platform data This patch set default value of MUIC register to bring up MUIC device. If user don't set some initial value for MUIC device through platform data, extcon-max77693 driver use 'default_init_data' to bring up base operation of MAX77693 MUIC device. Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi Signed-off-by: Myungjoo Ham --- include/linux/mfd/max77693-private.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/mfd/max77693-private.h b/include/linux/mfd/max77693-private.h index 5b18ecde69b5..1aa4f13cdfa6 100644 --- a/include/linux/mfd/max77693-private.h +++ b/include/linux/mfd/max77693-private.h @@ -106,6 +106,29 @@ enum max77693_muic_reg { MAX77693_MUIC_REG_END, }; +/* MAX77693 INTMASK1~2 Register */ +#define INTMASK1_ADC1K_SHIFT 3 +#define INTMASK1_ADCERR_SHIFT 2 +#define INTMASK1_ADCLOW_SHIFT 1 +#define INTMASK1_ADC_SHIFT 0 +#define INTMASK1_ADC1K_MASK (1 << INTMASK1_ADC1K_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK1_ADCERR_MASK (1 << INTMASK1_ADCERR_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK1_ADCLOW_MASK (1 << INTMASK1_ADCLOW_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK1_ADC_MASK (1 << INTMASK1_ADC_SHIFT) + +#define INTMASK2_VIDRM_SHIFT 5 +#define INTMASK2_VBVOLT_SHIFT 4 +#define INTMASK2_DXOVP_SHIFT 3 +#define INTMASK2_DCDTMR_SHIFT 2 +#define INTMASK2_CHGDETRUN_SHIFT 1 +#define INTMASK2_CHGTYP_SHIFT 0 +#define INTMASK2_VIDRM_MASK (1 << INTMASK2_VIDRM_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK2_VBVOLT_MASK (1 << INTMASK2_VBVOLT_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK2_DXOVP_MASK (1 << INTMASK2_DXOVP_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK2_DCDTMR_MASK (1 << INTMASK2_DCDTMR_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK2_CHGDETRUN_MASK (1 << INTMASK2_CHGDETRUN_SHIFT) +#define INTMASK2_CHGTYP_MASK (1 << INTMASK2_CHGTYP_SHIFT) + /* MAX77693 MUIC - STATUS1~3 Register */ #define STATUS1_ADC_SHIFT (0) #define STATUS1_ADCLOW_SHIFT (5) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 909b3fdb0dd4f3db07b2d75425a00a2adb551383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Beulich Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 15:06:23 +0000 Subject: xen-pciback: notify hypervisor about devices intended to be assigned to guests For MSI-X capable devices the hypervisor wants to write protect the MSI-X table and PBA, yet it can't assume that resources have been assigned to their final values at device enumeration time. Thus have pciback do that notification, as having the device controlled by it is a prerequisite to assigning the device to guests anyway. This is the kernel part of hypervisor side commit 4245d33 ("x86/MSI: add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses") on the master branch of git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- include/xen/interface/physdev.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/xen/interface/physdev.h b/include/xen/interface/physdev.h index 1844d31f4552..7000bb1f6e96 100644 --- a/include/xen/interface/physdev.h +++ b/include/xen/interface/physdev.h @@ -251,6 +251,12 @@ struct physdev_pci_device_add { #define PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove 26 #define PHYSDEVOP_restore_msi_ext 27 +/* + * Dom0 should use these two to announce MMIO resources assigned to + * MSI-X capable devices won't (prepare) or may (release) change. + */ +#define PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix 30 +#define PHYSDEVOP_release_msix 31 struct physdev_pci_device { /* IN */ uint16_t seg; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f5eb14135ba9d97ba4b8514fc7ef5e0dac2abf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lan Tianyu Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 16:48:12 +0800 Subject: usb: add find_raw_port_number callback to struct hc_driver() xhci driver divides the root hub into two logical hubs which work respectively for usb 2.0 and usb 3.0 devices. They are independent devices in the usb core. But in the ACPI table, it's one device node and all usb2.0 and usb3.0 ports are under it. Binding usb port with its acpi node needs the raw port number which is reflected in the xhci extended capabilities table. This patch is to add find_raw_port_number callback to struct hc_driver(), fill it with xhci_find_raw_port_number() which will return raw port number and add a wrap usb_hcd_find_raw_port_number(). Otherwise, refactor xhci_find_real_port_number(). Using xhci_find_raw_port_number() to get real index in the HW port status registers instead of scanning through the xHCI roothub port array. This can help to speed up. All addresses in xhci->usb2_ports and xhci->usb3_ports array are kown good ports and don't include following bad ports in the extended capabilities talbe. (1) root port that doesn't have an entry (2) root port with unknown speed (3) root port that is listed twice and with different speeds. So xhci_find_raw_port_number() will only return port num of good ones and never touch bad ports above. Signed-off-by: Lan Tianyu Signed-off-by: Sarah Sharp --- include/linux/usb/hcd.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/usb/hcd.h b/include/linux/usb/hcd.h index 0a78df5f6cfd..59694b5e5e90 100644 --- a/include/linux/usb/hcd.h +++ b/include/linux/usb/hcd.h @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ struct hc_driver { */ int (*disable_usb3_lpm_timeout)(struct usb_hcd *, struct usb_device *, enum usb3_link_state state); + int (*find_raw_port_number)(struct usb_hcd *, int); }; extern int usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb); @@ -396,6 +397,7 @@ extern int usb_hcd_is_primary_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd); extern int usb_add_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd, unsigned int irqnum, unsigned long irqflags); extern void usb_remove_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd); +extern int usb_hcd_find_raw_port_number(struct usb_hcd *hcd, int port1); struct platform_device; extern void usb_hcd_platform_shutdown(struct platform_device *dev); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2013 01:45:51 -0700 Subject: userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is established by setting the root directory will not be violated by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace creation. Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current root directory. For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access can not be violated by changing the root directory. Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical limitation for using user namespaces. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- include/linux/fs_struct.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/fs_struct.h b/include/linux/fs_struct.h index 729eded4b24f..2b93a9a5a1e6 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs_struct.h +++ b/include/linux/fs_struct.h @@ -50,4 +50,6 @@ static inline void get_fs_root_and_pwd(struct fs_struct *fs, struct path *root, spin_unlock(&fs->lock); } +extern bool current_chrooted(void); + #endif /* _LINUX_FS_STRUCT_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 90563b198e4c6674c63672fae1923da467215f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 03:10:15 -0700 Subject: vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only restriction. Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must remain read-only. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- include/linux/mount.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h index d7029f4a191a..73005f9957ea 100644 --- a/include/linux/mount.h +++ b/include/linux/mount.h @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct mnt_namespace; #define MNT_INTERNAL 0x4000 +#define MNT_LOCK_READONLY 0x400000 + struct vfsmount { struct dentry *mnt_root; /* root of the mounted tree */ struct super_block *mnt_sb; /* pointer to superblock */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2013 14:28:27 -0700 Subject: userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already mounted when the user namespace is created. proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that is shared between every instance. Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time the user namespace was created. In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all (some form of mount namespace jail). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 4ce009324933..b6b215f13b45 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct user_namespace { kuid_t owner; kgid_t group; unsigned int proc_inum; + bool may_mount_sysfs; + bool may_mount_proc; }; extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; @@ -82,4 +84,6 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) #endif +void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns); + #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 24f11a5cf538a8fcc10d61f457e9a2094fb965b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kravkov Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 06:54:00 +0000 Subject: line up comment for ndo_bridge_getlink Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kravkov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h index b3d00fa4b314..8bfa95600e48 100644 --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ struct netdev_fcoe_hbainfo { * * int (*ndo_bridge_setlink)(struct net_device *dev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) * int (*ndo_bridge_getlink)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq, - * struct net_device *dev) + * struct net_device *dev, u32 filter_mask) * * int (*ndo_change_carrier)(struct net_device *dev, bool new_carrier); * Called to change device carrier. Soft-devices (like dummy, team, etc) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 09a9f1d27892255cfb9c91203f19476765e2d8d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michel Lespinasse Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:26:23 -0700 Subject: Revert "mm: introduce VM_POPULATE flag to better deal with racy userspace programs" This reverts commit 186930500985 ("mm: introduce VM_POPULATE flag to better deal with racy userspace programs"). VM_POPULATE only has any effect when userspace plays racy games with vmas by trying to unmap and remap memory regions that mmap or mlock are operating on. Also, the only effect of VM_POPULATE when userspace plays such games is that it avoids populating new memory regions that get remapped into the address range that was being operated on by the original mmap or mlock calls. Let's remove VM_POPULATE as there isn't any strong argument to mandate a new vm_flag. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/mm.h | 1 - include/linux/mman.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 7acc9dc73c9f..e19ff30ad0a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #define VM_PFNMAP 0x00000400 /* Page-ranges managed without "struct page", just pure PFN */ #define VM_DENYWRITE 0x00000800 /* ETXTBSY on write attempts.. */ -#define VM_POPULATE 0x00001000 #define VM_LOCKED 0x00002000 #define VM_IO 0x00004000 /* Memory mapped I/O or similar */ diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h index 61c7a87e5d2b..9aa863da287f 100644 --- a/include/linux/mman.h +++ b/include/linux/mman.h @@ -79,8 +79,6 @@ calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags) { return _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN, VM_GROWSDOWN ) | _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE, VM_DENYWRITE ) | - ((flags & MAP_LOCKED) ? (VM_LOCKED | VM_POPULATE) : 0) | - (((flags & (MAP_POPULATE | MAP_NONBLOCK)) == MAP_POPULATE) ? - VM_POPULATE : 0); + _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_LOCKED, VM_LOCKED ); } #endif /* _LINUX_MMAN_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From dbf520a9d7d4d5ba28d2947be11e34099a5e3e20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Walmsley Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2013 00:04:40 +0000 Subject: Revert "lockdep: check that no locks held at freeze time" This reverts commit 6aa9707099c4b25700940eb3d016f16c4434360d. Commit 6aa9707099c4 ("lockdep: check that no locks held at freeze time") causes problems with NFS root filesystems. The failures were noticed on OMAP2 and 3 boards during kernel init: [ BUG: swapper/0/1 still has locks held! ] 3.9.0-rc3-00344-ga937536 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------- 1 lock held by swapper/0/1: #0: (&type->s_umount_key#13/1){+.+.+.}, at: [] sget+0x248/0x574 stack backtrace: rpc_wait_bit_killable __wait_on_bit out_of_line_wait_on_bit __rpc_execute rpc_run_task rpc_call_sync nfs_proc_get_root nfs_get_root nfs_fs_mount_common nfs_try_mount nfs_fs_mount mount_fs vfs_kern_mount do_mount sys_mount do_mount_root mount_root prepare_namespace kernel_init_freeable kernel_init Although the rootfs mounts, the system is unstable. Here's a transcript from a PM test: http://www.pwsan.com/omap/testlogs/test_v3.9-rc3/20130317194234/pm/37xxevm/37xxevm_log.txt Here's what the test log should look like: http://www.pwsan.com/omap/testlogs/test_v3.8/20130218214403/pm/37xxevm/37xxevm_log.txt Mailing list discussion is here: http://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/221 Deal with this for v3.9 by reverting the problem commit, until folks can figure out the right long-term course of action. Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines Cc: Jeff Layton Cc: Shawn Guo Cc: Cc: Fengguang Wu Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Ben Chan Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki Cc: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/debug_locks.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/freezer.h | 3 --- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/debug_locks.h b/include/linux/debug_locks.h index a975de1ff59f..3bd46f766751 100644 --- a/include/linux/debug_locks.h +++ b/include/linux/debug_locks.h @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct task_struct; extern void debug_show_all_locks(void); extern void debug_show_held_locks(struct task_struct *task); extern void debug_check_no_locks_freed(const void *from, unsigned long len); -extern void debug_check_no_locks_held(void); +extern void debug_check_no_locks_held(struct task_struct *task); #else static inline void debug_show_all_locks(void) { @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ debug_check_no_locks_freed(const void *from, unsigned long len) } static inline void -debug_check_no_locks_held(void) +debug_check_no_locks_held(struct task_struct *task) { } #endif diff --git a/include/linux/freezer.h b/include/linux/freezer.h index 043a5cf8b5ba..e70df40d84f6 100644 --- a/include/linux/freezer.h +++ b/include/linux/freezer.h @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ #ifndef FREEZER_H_INCLUDED #define FREEZER_H_INCLUDED -#include #include #include #include @@ -49,8 +48,6 @@ extern void thaw_kernel_threads(void); static inline bool try_to_freeze(void) { - if (!(current->flags & PF_NOFREEZE)) - debug_check_no_locks_held(); might_sleep(); if (likely(!freezing(current))) return false; -- cgit v1.2.3