From 17b919f0e667ea326549e499a3f54433478447c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiwei Bie Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 13:37:00 +0800 Subject: vhost/test: fix build for vhost test commit 264b563b8675771834419057cbe076c1a41fb666 upstream. Since vhost_exceeds_weight() was introduced, callers need to specify the packet weight and byte weight in vhost_dev_init(). Note that, the packet weight isn't counted in this patch to keep the original behavior unchanged. Fixes: e82b9b0727ff ("vhost: introduce vhost_exceeds_weight()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vhost/test.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/vhost') diff --git a/drivers/vhost/test.c b/drivers/vhost/test.c index f2882ac98726..6666ca451452 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/test.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/test.c @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ * Using this limit prevents one virtqueue from starving others. */ #define VHOST_TEST_WEIGHT 0x80000 +/* Max number of packets transferred before requeueing the job. + * Using this limit prevents one virtqueue from starving others with + * pkts. + */ +#define VHOST_TEST_PKT_WEIGHT 256 + enum { VHOST_TEST_VQ = 0, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX = 1, @@ -81,10 +87,8 @@ static void handle_vq(struct vhost_test *n) } vhost_add_used_and_signal(&n->dev, vq, head, 0); total_len += len; - if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_TEST_WEIGHT)) { - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); + if (unlikely(vhost_exceeds_weight(vq, 0, total_len))) break; - } } mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex); @@ -116,7 +120,8 @@ static int vhost_test_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f) dev = &n->dev; vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ] = &n->vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ]; n->vqs[VHOST_TEST_VQ].handle_kick = handle_vq_kick; - vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX); + vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_TEST_VQ_MAX, + VHOST_TEST_PKT_WEIGHT, VHOST_TEST_WEIGHT); f->private_data = n; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 35b29a78cc9b2523f6b0c080e6b44d2eeb367023 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yongduan Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2019 17:44:24 +0800 Subject: vhost: make sure log_num < in_num commit 060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4 upstream. The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor. As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0, it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This bug can be triggered during the VM migration. There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num in this case. Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen Signed-off-by: ruippan Signed-off-by: yongduan Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/vhost') diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c index 0f653f314876..eb7a4df69e2b 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c @@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ static int get_indirect(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, /* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */ if (desc.flags & cpu_to_vhost16(vq, VRING_DESC_F_WRITE)) { *in_num += ret; - if (unlikely(log)) { + if (unlikely(log && ret)) { log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr); log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len); ++*log_num; @@ -1453,7 +1453,7 @@ int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, /* If this is an input descriptor, * increment that count. */ *in_num += ret; - if (unlikely(log)) { + if (unlikely(log && ret)) { log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr); log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len); ++*log_num; -- cgit v1.2.3