From 146c8a77d27bcbd7722120f70f51e3b287205d0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Durrant Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 17:50:28 +0100 Subject: xen-netback: add support for IPv6 checksum offload to guest Check xenstore flag feature-ipv6-csum-offload to determine if a guest is happy to accept IPv6 packets with only partial checksum. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Cc: Wei Liu Cc: David Vrabel Cc: Ian Campbell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h index 5715318d6bab..b4a9a3c844b2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h @@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ struct xenvif { u8 can_sg:1; u8 gso:1; u8 gso_prefix:1; - u8 csum:1; + u8 ip_csum:1; + u8 ipv6_csum:1; /* Internal feature information. */ u8 can_queue:1; /* can queue packets for receiver? */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 82cada22a0bbec6a7afb573ef5fb6c512aaa2739 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Durrant Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 17:50:32 +0100 Subject: xen-netback: enable IPv6 TCP GSO to the guest This patch adds code to handle SKB_GSO_TCPV6 skbs and construct appropriate extra or prefix segments to pass the large packet to the frontend. New xenstore flags, feature-gso-tcpv6 and feature-gso-tcpv6-prefix, are sampled to determine if the frontend is capable of handling such packets. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Cc: Wei Liu Cc: David Vrabel Cc: Ian Campbell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h index b4a9a3c844b2..55b8dec86233 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h @@ -87,9 +87,13 @@ struct pending_tx_info { struct xenvif_rx_meta { int id; int size; + int gso_type; int gso_size; }; +#define GSO_BIT(type) \ + (1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_ ## type) + /* Discriminate from any valid pending_idx value. */ #define INVALID_PENDING_IDX 0xFFFF @@ -150,9 +154,10 @@ struct xenvif { u8 fe_dev_addr[6]; /* Frontend feature information. */ + int gso_mask; + int gso_prefix_mask; + u8 can_sg:1; - u8 gso:1; - u8 gso_prefix:1; u8 ip_csum:1; u8 ipv6_csum:1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 059dfa6a93b779516321e5112db9d7621b1367ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Liu Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2013 12:07:57 +0000 Subject: xen-netback: use jiffies_64 value to calculate credit timeout time_after_eq() only works if the delta is < MAX_ULONG/2. For a 32bit Dom0, if netfront sends packets at a very low rate, the time between subsequent calls to tx_credit_exceeded() may exceed MAX_ULONG/2 and the test for timer_after_eq() will be incorrect. Credit will not be replenished and the guest may become unable to send packets (e.g., if prior to the long gap, all credit was exhausted). Use jiffies_64 variant to mitigate this problem for 32bit Dom0. Suggested-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Reviewed-by: David Vrabel Cc: Ian Campbell Cc: Jason Luan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h index 5715318d6bab..400fea1de080 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ struct xenvif { unsigned long credit_usec; unsigned long remaining_credit; struct timer_list credit_timeout; + u64 credit_window_start; /* Statistics */ unsigned long rx_gso_checksum_fixup; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ac3d5ac277352fe6e27809286768e9f1f8aa388d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Durrant Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2013 09:27:17 +0000 Subject: xen-netback: fix guest-receive-side array sizes The sizes chosen for the metadata and grant_copy_op arrays on the guest receive size are wrong; - The meta array is needlessly twice the ring size, when we only ever consume a single array element per RX ring slot - The grant_copy_op array is way too small. It's sized based on a bogus assumption: that at most two copy ops will be used per ring slot. This may have been true at some point in the past but it's clear from looking at start_new_rx_buffer() that a new ring slot is only consumed if a frag would overflow the current slot (plus some other conditions) so the actual limit is MAX_SKB_FRAGS grant_copy_ops per ring slot. This patch fixes those two sizing issues and, because grant_copy_ops grows so much, it pulls it out into a separate chunk of vmalloc()ed memory. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Acked-by: Wei Liu Cc: Ian Campbell Cc: David Vrabel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h') diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h index 08ae01b41c83..c47794b9d42f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h @@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ struct xenvif_rx_meta { #define MAX_PENDING_REQS 256 +/* It's possible for an skb to have a maximal number of frags + * but still be less than MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET in size. Thus the + * worst-case number of copy operations is MAX_SKB_FRAGS per + * ring slot. + */ +#define MAX_GRANT_COPY_OPS (MAX_SKB_FRAGS * XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE) + struct xenvif { /* Unique identifier for this interface. */ domid_t domid; @@ -143,13 +150,13 @@ struct xenvif { */ RING_IDX rx_req_cons_peek; - /* Given MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET of 4096 the worst case is that each - * head/fragment page uses 2 copy operations because it - * straddles two buffers in the frontend. - */ - struct gnttab_copy grant_copy_op[2*XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE]; - struct xenvif_rx_meta meta[2*XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE]; + /* This array is allocated seperately as it is large */ + struct gnttab_copy *grant_copy_op; + /* We create one meta structure per ring request we consume, so + * the maximum number is the same as the ring size. + */ + struct xenvif_rx_meta meta[XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE]; u8 fe_dev_addr[6]; -- cgit v1.2.3