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2024-10-17Merge remote-tracking branch 'msm8998/lineage-20' into lineage-20Raghuram Subramani
Change-Id: I126075a330f305c85f8fe1b8c9d408f368be95d1
2024-01-02lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooksPaul Moore
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Change-Id: Ic0f16cf514773f473705d48c787527f910943f1a
2023-11-02ICE, pfk: fix to set dio_inode preciselyJaegeuk Kim
When using loopback device with dio, we can't rely on page flag. Bug: 141601405 Bug: 141860559 Bug: 140882488 Change-Id: I09526c25e8d5333853e777f29333f9fa8da37459 Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
2022-11-05ANDROID: selinux: modify RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL}Bram Bonné
Map the permission gating RTM_GETNEIGH/RTM_GETNEIGHTBL messages to a new permission so that it can be distinguished from the other netlink route permissions in selinux policy. The new permission is triggered by a flag set in system images T and up. This change is intended to be backported to all kernels that a T system image can run on top of. Bug: 171572148 Test: atest NetworkInterfaceTest Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases Test: atest bionic-unit-tests-static Test: On Cuttlefish, run combinations of: - Policy bit set or omitted (see https://r.android.com/1701847) - This patch applied or omitted - App having nlmsg_readneigh permission or not Verify that only the combination of this patch + the policy bit being set + the app not having the nlmsg_readneigh permission prevents the app from sending RTM_GETNEIGH messages. Change-Id: I4bcfce4decb34ea9388eeedfc4be67403de8a980 Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com> (cherry picked from commit fac07550bdac9adea0dbe3edbdbec7a9a690a178) (cherry picked from commit 32d7afd1472c3cce509a3455b40a575540eac780) CVE-2022-20399 Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
2022-10-28BACKPORT: treewide: Fix function prototypes for module_param_call()Kees Cook
Several function prototypes for the set/get functions defined by module_param_call() have a slightly wrong argument types. This fixes those in an effort to clean up the calls when running under type-enforced compiler instrumentation for CFI. This is the result of running the following semantic patch: @match_module_param_call_function@ declarer name module_param_call; identifier _name, _set_func, _get_func; expression _arg, _mode; @@ module_param_call(_name, _set_func, _get_func, _arg, _mode); @fix_set_prototype depends on match_module_param_call_function@ identifier match_module_param_call_function._set_func; identifier _val, _param; type _val_type, _param_type; @@ int _set_func( -_val_type _val +const char * _val , -_param_type _param +const struct kernel_param * _param ) { ... } @fix_get_prototype depends on match_module_param_call_function@ identifier match_module_param_call_function._get_func; identifier _val, _param; type _val_type, _param_type; @@ int _get_func( -_val_type _val +char * _val , -_param_type _param +const struct kernel_param * _param ) { ... } Two additional by-hand changes are included for places where the above Coccinelle script didn't notice them: drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c fs/lockd/svc.c Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Bug: 67506682 Change-Id: I2c9c0ee8ed28065e63270a52c155e5e7d2791295 (cherry picked from commit e4dca7b7aa08b22893c45485d222b5807c1375ae) Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> (cherry picked from commit 24da2c84bd7dcdf2b56fa8d3b2f833656ee60a01) Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <daloni@magicleap.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
2022-10-28selinux: always allow mounting submountsOndrej Mosnacek
[ Upstream commit 2cbdcb882f97a45f7475c67ac6257bbc16277dfe ] If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the mount permission check should be skipped for them. Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials. In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places: - AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells - CIFS, when automounting "referrals" - NFS, when automounting subtrees - debugfs, when automounting tracefs In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in: - sget_userns() in fs/super.c: if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - sget() in fs/super.c: /* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */ if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite. Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Change-Id: Ic9e93767d111b54845c2ca24c4fc10be64e32fb6
2022-04-19UPSTREAM: security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffsConnor O'Brien
Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of bpffs files. This allows for separate permissions for different pinned bpf objects, which may be completely unrelated to each other. Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Moreland <smoreland@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (cherry picked from commit 4ca54d3d3022ce27170b50e4bdecc3a42f05dbdc) [which is v5.6-rc1-10-g4ca54d3d3022 and thus already included in 5.10] Bug: 200440527 Change-Id: I8234b9047f29981b8140bd81bb2ff070b3b0b843 (cherry picked from commit d52ac987ad2ae16ff313d7fb6185bc412cb221a4)
2022-04-19selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checksStephen Smalley
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated with the init user namespace versus capability checks against a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining and using separate security classes for the latter. This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace. Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-04-19selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode labelPaul Moore
There is no point in trying to revalidate an inode's security label if the security server is not yet initialized. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-04-19selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possiblePaul Moore
Since looking up an inode's label can result in revalidation, delay the lookup as long as possible to limit the performance impact. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-04-19selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting itPaul Moore
There is no point in attempting to revalidate an inode's security label when we are in the process of setting it. Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-04-19selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZEDPaul Moore
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-04-19selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fixAndreas Gruenbacher
Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original performance. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-04-19selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labelsAndreas Gruenbacher
When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid label. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2022-04-19security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labelsAndreas Gruenbacher
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached information becomes invalid. Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes invalid. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2022-04-19selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_securityAndreas Gruenbacher
Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2022-04-19security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-constAndreas Gruenbacher
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2022-04-19security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-constAndreas Gruenbacher
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2022-04-19selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_securityAndreas Gruenbacher
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2022-04-19UPSTREAM: selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receiveChenbo Feng
Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program. This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry-pick from net-next: f66e448cfda021b0bcd884f26709796fe19c7cc1) Bug: 30950746 Change-Id: I5b2cf4ccb4eab7eda91ddd7091d6aa3e7ed9f2cd Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
2022-04-19UPSTREAM: selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operationsChenbo Feng
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object, selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry-pick from net-next: ec27c3568a34c7fe5fcf4ac0a354eda77687f7eb) Bug: 30950746 Change-Id: Ifb0cdd4b7d470223b143646b339ba511ac77c156 Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com> Change-Id: I073b5ebe76a280267289357af2b5d8f3afcaffa4
2022-04-19BACKPORT: security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscallChenbo Feng
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Added the LIST_HEAD_INIT call for security hooks, it nolonger exist in uptream code. (cherry-pick from net-next: afdb09c720b62b8090584c11151d856df330e57d) Bug: 30950746 Change-Id: Ieb3ac74392f531735fc7c949b83346a5f587a77b Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
2022-04-19fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super blockSeth Forshee
Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged. Add a new helper function, current_in_user_ns(), to test whether a user namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace. Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set should be applied to the caps constructed during exec. --EWB Replaced in_userns with the simpler current_in_userns. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
2022-01-05selinux: initialize proto variable in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()Tom Rix
commit 732bc2ff080c447f8524f40c970c481f5da6eed3 upstream. Clang static analysis reports this warning hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized value if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto. The later call to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can return ok if the garbage proto value matches. So initialize proto. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eef9b41622f2 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> [PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-26smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doiTetsuo Handa
[ Upstream commit 0934ad42bb2c5df90a1b9de690f93de735b622fe ] syzbot is reporting UAF at cipso_v4_doi_search() [1], for smk_cipso_doi() is calling kfree() without removing from the cipso_v4_doi_list list after netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add() returned an error. We need to use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() in order to remove from the list and wait for RCU grace period before kfree(). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=93dba5b91f0fed312cbd [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+93dba5b91f0fed312cbd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 6c2e8ac0953fccdd ("netlabel: Update kernel configuration API") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi()Tetsuo Handa
[ Upstream commit f91488ee15bd3cac467e2d6a361fc2d34d1052ae ] syzbot is reporting kernel panic at smk_cipso_doi() due to memory allocation fault injection [1]. The reason for need to use panic() was not explained. But since no fix was proposed for 18 months, for now let's use __GFP_NOFAIL for utilizing syzbot resource on other bugs. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89731ccb6fec15ce1c22 [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89731ccb6fec15ce1c22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()Pawan Gupta
[ Upstream commit 0817534ff9ea809fac1322c5c8c574be8483ea57 ] Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as described in [1]. The bug is triggered when smk_set_cipso() tries to free stale category bitmaps while there are concurrent reader(s) using the same bitmaps. Wait for RCU grace period to finish before freeing the category bitmaps in smk_set_cipso(). This makes sure that there are no more readers using the stale bitmaps and freeing them should be safe. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000a814c505ca657a4e@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+3f91de0b813cc3d19a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checksTodd Kjos
commit 52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe upstream. Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-22BACKPORT: binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checksTodd Kjos
commit 52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe upstream. Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Change-Id: Id7157515d2b08f11683aeb8ad9b8f1da075d34e7 [tkjos@ Fixed minor conflicts] Bug: 200688826 Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
2021-09-22Smack: Fix wrong semantics in smk_access_entry()Tianjia Zhang
[ Upstream commit 6d14f5c7028eea70760df284057fe198ce7778dd ] In the smk_access_entry() function, if no matching rule is found in the rust_list, a negative error code will be used to perform bit operations with the MAY_ enumeration value. This is semantically wrong. This patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-20selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVCMinchan Kim
[ Upstream commit 648f2c6100cfa18e7dfe43bc0b9c3b73560d623c ] In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call path below. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0 ... ... 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace: 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc+0x28/0x88 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0 .. .. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation. Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together. [1] 476accbe2f6e ("selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches") Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [PM: subj fix, line wraps, normalized commit refs] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-03-03KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failingJarkko Sakkinen
commit 8da7520c80468c48f981f0b81fc1be6599e3b0ad upstream. Consider the following transcript: $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument The documentation has the following description: migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL. [*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-23dump_common_audit_data(): fix racy accesses to ->d_nameAl Viro
commit d36a1dd9f77ae1e72da48f4123ed35627848507d upstream. We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent dentry getting renamed right under us. And it's possible for old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here. Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-12-13ANDROID: selinux: modify RTM_GETLINK permissionJeff Vander Stoep
Map the permission gating RTM_GETLINK messages to a new permission so that it can be distinguished from the other netlink route permissions in selinux policy. This is a temporary Android-only patch that will be deprecated in newer kernels once the long-term solution lands as discusssed on the mailing list [1]. The maintainer's recommended solution is more general, much more complex, and likely not suitable for backporting. This patch provides the minimal change needed for Android including the userspace settable trigger which ensures that the permission change is only applied to the newest version of Android which contains the changes needed for userpace compatibility. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200116142653.61738-1-jeffv@google.com/ Bug: 141455849 Bug: 148218425 Test: CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases Test: atest bionic-unit-tests-static Test: atest NetworkInterfaceTest Test: Connect to Wi-Fi network Test: Set up hotspot Test: Cast from device Test: Pair Bluetooth device Test: Call getifaddrs() directly from within an app. Test: Call NetworkInterface#getNetworkInterfaces() from within an app. Change-Id: I7b44ce60ad98f858c412722d41b9842f8577151f Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common Git-commit: ba835f8db4a3005e34542a3af7f19fce30ade6fd Signed-off-by: Alam Md Danish <amddan@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
2020-10-29ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()Roberto Sassu
commit 60386b854008adc951c470067f90a2d85b5d520f upstream. Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-01selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position indexVasily Averin
[ Upstream commit 8d269a8e2a8f0bca89022f4ec98de460acb90365 ] If seq_file .next function does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output. $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees 817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037 1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683 1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s $# read after lseek to midle of last line $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 056 9115 <<<< end of last line 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<< whole last line once again 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s $# read after lseek beyond end of of file $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<<< generates whole last line 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283 Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-08-21Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()Dan Carpenter
[ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ] We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative values. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-08-21Smack: fix another vsscanf out of boundsDan Carpenter
[ Upstream commit a6bd4f6d9b07452b0b19842044a6c3ea384b0b88 ] This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule". Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-08-21Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()Eric Biggers
commit beb4ee6770a89646659e6a2178538d2b13e2654e upstream. smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple tasks can share the same credentials structure. Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify the task's credentials. Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self": #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> static void *thrproc(void *arg) { int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY); for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3); } int main() { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL); thrproc(NULL); } Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-21nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattrAndreas Gruenbacher
[ Upstream commit c4803c497fbdb37e96af614813a7cfb434b6682a ] Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-29selinux: fix double freeTom Rix
commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream. Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(bnames[i]); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(bvalues); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rulesRoberto Sassu
[ Upstream commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b ] This patch prevents the following oops: [ 10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000 [...] [ 10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80 [...] [ 10.798576] Call Trace: [ 10.798993] ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 10.799753] ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 10.800484] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0 [ 10.801592] ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0 [ 10.802313] ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 10.803167] ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70 [ 10.804004] ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80 [ 10.804800] do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0 It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy() but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end of ima_init_policy(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules") Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculationKrzysztof Struczynski
commit 1129d31b55d509f15e72dc68e4b5c3a4d7b4da8d upstream. Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable. Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots. Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanfCasey Schaufler
commit 84e99e58e8d1e26f04c097f4266e431a33987f36 upstream. Add barrier to soob. Return -EOVERFLOW if the buffer is exceeded. Suggested-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Reported-by: syzbot+bfdd4a2f07be52351350@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-03exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_credsEric W. Biederman
[ Upstream commit a4ae32c71fe90794127b32d26d7ad795813b502e ] An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value. The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials. Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials. Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious. But it is definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly. I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Fixes: 58319057b784 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-05-27evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()Roberto Sassu
[ Upstream commit 53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698 ] This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition: Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() <= error pointer Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) <= *tfm is not NULL, use it Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) <= panic Task A: *tfm = NULL This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new crypto context must be created. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash") Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-05-05selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()Paul Moore
commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream. Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected the first message in the sk_buff. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-04-24KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctlyYang Xu
commit 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d upstream. Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below: add_key() key_create_or_update() key_alloc() __key_instantiate_and_link generic_key_instantiate key_payload_reserve ...... Since commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"), we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we can keep consistent with key_alloc. Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key(). Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Fixes: a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-28selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()Jaihind Yadav
[ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ] In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate() fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it. Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-01-23ANDROID: selinux: modify RTM_GETLINK permissionJeff Vander Stoep
Map the permission gating RTM_GETLINK messages to a new permission so that it can be distinguished from the other netlink route permissions in selinux policy. This is a temporary Android-only patch that will be deprecated in newer kernels once the long-term solution lands as discusssed on the mailing list [1]. The maintainer's recommended solution is more general, much more complex, and likely not suitable for backporting. This patch provides the minimal change needed for Android including the userspace settable trigger which ensures that the permission change is only applied to the newest version of Android which contains the changes needed for userpace compatibility. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200116142653.61738-1-jeffv@google.com/ Bug: 141455849 Bug: 148218425 Test: CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases Test: atest bionic-unit-tests-static Test: atest NetworkInterfaceTest Test: Connect to Wi-Fi network Test: Set up hotspot Test: Cast from device Test: Pair Bluetooth device Test: Call getifaddrs() directly from within an app. Test: Call NetworkInterface#getNetworkInterfaces() from within an app. Change-Id: I7b44ce60ad98f858c412722d41b9842f8577151f Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2026-07-10 10:48:42 +0000