| Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Change-Id: I126075a330f305c85f8fe1b8c9d408f368be95d1
|
|
Bug: 184613044
Test: driver probe and attributes access normally
Signed-off-by: Albert Wang <albertccwang@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia34cfd8e76a21f7239e356608e46ddeebd6fa10a
|
|
Currently, eBPF only understands BPF_JGT (>), BPF_JGE (>=),
BPF_JSGT (s>), BPF_JSGE (s>=) instructions, this means that
particularly *JLT/*JLE counterparts involving immediates need
to be rewritten from e.g. X < [IMM] by swapping arguments into
[IMM] > X, meaning the immediate first is required to be loaded
into a register Y := [IMM], such that then we can compare with
Y > X. Note that the destination operand is always required to
be a register.
This has the downside of having unnecessarily increased register
pressure, meaning complex program would need to spill other
registers temporarily to stack in order to obtain an unused
register for the [IMM]. Loading to registers will thus also
affect state pruning since we need to account for that register
use and potentially those registers that had to be spilled/filled
again. As a consequence slightly more stack space might have
been used due to spilling, and BPF programs are a bit longer
due to extra code involving the register load and potentially
required spill/fills.
Thus, add BPF_JLT (<), BPF_JLE (<=), BPF_JSLT (s<), BPF_JSLE (s<=)
counterparts to the eBPF instruction set. Modifying LLVM to
remove the NegateCC() workaround in a PoC patch at [1] and
allowing it to also emit the new instructions resulted in
cilium's BPF programs that are injected into the fast-path to
have a reduced program length in the range of 2-3% (e.g.
accumulated main and tail call sections from one of the object
file reduced from 4864 to 4729 insns), reduced complexity in
the range of 10-30% (e.g. accumulated sections reduced in one
of the cases from 116432 to 88428 insns), and reduced stack
usage in the range of 1-5% (e.g. accumulated sections from one
of the object files reduced from 824 to 784b).
The modification for LLVM will be incorporated in a backwards
compatible way. Plan is for LLVM to have i) a target specific
option to offer a possibility to explicitly enable the extension
by the user (as we have with -m target specific extensions today
for various CPU insns), and ii) have the kernel checked for
presence of the extensions and enable them transparently when
the user is selecting more aggressive options such as -march=native
in a bpf target context. (Other frontends generating BPF byte
code, e.g. ply can probe the kernel directly for its code
generation.)
[1] https://github.com/borkmann/llvm/tree/bpf-insns
Change-Id: Ic56500aaeaf5f3ebdfda094ad6ef4666c82e18c5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
cpu-local slices
commit de53fd7aedb100f03e5d2231cfce0e4993282425 upstream.
It has been observed, that highly-threaded, non-cpu-bound applications
running under cpu.cfs_quota_us constraints can hit a high percentage of
periods throttled while simultaneously not consuming the allocated
amount of quota. This use case is typical of user-interactive non-cpu
bound applications, such as those running in kubernetes or mesos when
run on multiple cpu cores.
This has been root caused to cpu-local run queue being allocated per cpu
bandwidth slices, and then not fully using that slice within the period.
At which point the slice and quota expires. This expiration of unused
slice results in applications not being able to utilize the quota for
which they are allocated.
The non-expiration of per-cpu slices was recently fixed by
'commit 512ac999d275 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift
condition")'. Prior to that it appears that this had been broken since
at least 'commit 51f2176d74ac ("sched/fair: Fix unlocked reads of some
cfs_b->quota/period")' which was introduced in v3.16-rc1 in 2014. That
added the following conditional which resulted in slices never being
expired.
if (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires) {
/* extend local deadline, drift is bounded above by 2 ticks */
cfs_rq->runtime_expires += TICK_NSEC;
Because this was broken for nearly 5 years, and has recently been fixed
and is now being noticed by many users running kubernetes
(https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/67577) it is my opinion
that the mechanisms around expiring runtime should be removed
altogether.
This allows quota already allocated to per-cpu run-queues to live longer
than the period boundary. This allows threads on runqueues that do not
use much CPU to continue to use their remaining slice over a longer
period of time than cpu.cfs_period_us. However, this helps prevent the
above condition of hitting throttling while also not fully utilizing
your cpu quota.
This theoretically allows a machine to use slightly more than its
allotted quota in some periods. This overflow would be bounded by the
remaining quota left on each per-cpu runqueueu. This is typically no
more than min_cfs_rq_runtime=1ms per cpu. For CPU bound tasks this will
change nothing, as they should theoretically fully utilize all of their
quota in each period. For user-interactive tasks as described above this
provides a much better user/application experience as their cpu
utilization will more closely match the amount they requested when they
hit throttling. This means that cpu limits no longer strictly apply per
period for non-cpu bound applications, but that they are still accurate
over longer timeframes.
This greatly improves performance of high-thread-count, non-cpu bound
applications with low cfs_quota_us allocation on high-core-count
machines. In the case of an artificial testcase (10ms/100ms of quota on
80 CPU machine), this commit resulted in almost 30x performance
improvement, while still maintaining correct cpu quota restrictions.
That testcase is available at https://github.com/indeedeng/fibtest.
Fixes: 512ac999d275 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition")
Change-Id: I7d7a39fb554ec0c31f9381f492165f43c70b3924
Signed-off-by: Dave Chiluk <chiluk+linux@indeed.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hammond <jhammond@indeed.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kyle Anderson <kwa@yelp.com>
Cc: Gabriel Munos <gmunoz@netflix.com>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@posk.io>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563900266-19734-2-git-send-email-chiluk+linux@indeed.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
The thin archives build currently puts all lib.a and built-in.o
files together and links them with --whole-archive.
This works because thin archives can recursively refer to thin
archives. However some architectures include libgcc.a, which may
not be a thin archive, or it may not be constructed with the "P"
option, in which case its contents do not get linked correctly.
So don't pull .a libs into the root built-in.o archive. These
libs should already have symbol tables and indexes built, so they
can be direct linker inputs. Move them out of the --whole-archive
option, which restore the conditional linking behaviour of lib.a
to thin archives builds.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Change-Id: I42d8c27102477c7a21f29f3f4e7c6f19691ddca6
|
|
commit a0d1c951ef08ed24f35129267e3595d86f57f5d3 upstream.
As Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst implies, building the kernel with a
full set of LLVM tools gets very verbose and unwieldy.
Provide a single switch LLVM=1 to use Clang and LLVM tools instead
of GCC and Binutils. You can pass it from the command line or as an
environment variable.
Please note LLVM=1 does not turn on the integrated assembler. You need
to pass LLVM_IAS=1 to use it. When the upstream kernel is ready for the
integrated assembler, I think we can make it default.
We discussed what we need, and we agreed to go with a simple boolean
flag that switches both target and host tools:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/3/28/494
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/4/3/43
Some items discussed, but not adopted:
- LLVM_DIR
When multiple versions of LLVM are installed, I just thought supporting
LLVM_DIR=/path/to/my/llvm/bin/ might be useful.
CC = $(LLVM_DIR)clang
LD = $(LLVM_DIR)ld.lld
...
However, we can handle this by modifying PATH. So, we decided to not do
this.
- LLVM_SUFFIX
Some distributions (e.g. Debian) package specific versions of LLVM with
naming conventions that use the version as a suffix.
CC = clang$(LLVM_SUFFIX)
LD = ld.lld(LLVM_SUFFIX)
...
will allow a user to pass LLVM_SUFFIX=-11 to use clang-11 etc.,
but the suffixed versions in /usr/bin/ are symlinks to binaries in
/usr/lib/llvm-#/bin/, so this can also be handled by PATH.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> # build
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
[nd: conflict in exported vars list from not backporting commit
e83b9f55448a ("kbuild: add ability to generate BTF type info for vmlinux")]
[nd: hunk against Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.rst dropped due to not backporting
commit cd238effefa2 ("docs: kbuild: convert docs to ReST and rename to *.rst")]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry-picked from commit 62353048e2d4e398cfc22dbee3e1a7f6f535dcc1)
Change-Id: Ib62c20d4d01b0b95bdcd5e73fa18f32cdb8f585c
|
|
commit 7e20e47c70f810d678d02941fa3c671209c4ca97 upstream.
The 'AS' variable is unused for building the kernel. Only the remaining
usage is to turn on the integrated assembler. A boolean flag is a better
fit for this purpose.
AS=clang was added for experts. So, I replaced it with LLVM_IAS=1,
breaking the backward compatibility.
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry-picked from commit 7e20e47c70f810d678d02941fa3c671209c4ca97)
Change-Id: I1dcf901b2543ee6a95cfffddd2ced50b0a1ae14c
|
|
The tool is called llvm-size, not llvm-objsize.
Fixes: fcf1b6a35c16 ("Documentation/llvm: add documentation on building w/ Clang/LLVM")
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f44fbc162b737ff6251ae248184390ae2279fee)
Change-Id: Ib6ff2a256b55983d0a3e9bb10f53f7a5c3c214d2
|
|
Added to kbuild documentation. Provides more official info on building
kernels with Clang and LLVM than our wiki.
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit fcf1b6a35c16ac500fa908a4022238e5d666eabf)
Change-Id: I33bc4a97cf9e9ef923712bb490df0bceac81dade
|
|
Allow architectures to create arch/xxx/Makefile.postlink with targets
for vmlinux, modules.ko, and clean, which will be invoked after final
linking of vmlinux and modules.
powerpc will use this to check vmlinux linker relocations for sanity,
and may use it to fix up alternate instruction patch branch addresses.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit fbe6e37dab974dd0fc3660c001895f7bfd771c9a)
Change-Id: Ic312087b1dc0e19797ea1bde54e61e84b300c45b
Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <daloni@magicleap.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
|
|
* Squash of:
commit 9c909f4a62201b2ebb0ba56038d31bb85ae55d81
Author: Subhajeet Muhuri <kenny3fcb@gmail.com>
Date: Sun Oct 28 14:47:09 2018 +0100
Revert "msm: camera: Add laser LED support for depth sensor"
* "Camera error: Can't connect to the camera"
This reverts commit 63f5792c5c6a8de2e40a9eee1195dfa264ff9431.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit f7229d06853654871e970aa7bf604b01f38c3d37
Author: Subhajeet Muhuri <kenny3fcb@gmail.com>
Date: Thu Oct 11 20:21:32 2018 +0530
Revert "msm: camera: Bypass redundant creation of video node in stereo"
* Camera crashes upon launching
This reverts commit f977e44aeaf5da07338a4649caa45367461226f0.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit b0b964a9b6714ee4ff6af4e7f587f99921e3312a
Author: YaroST12 <yaro330@gmail.com>
Date: Sat Oct 6 18:36:18 2018 +0530
Revert "msm: cpp: Query buffer from buffer manager based on index"
* Breaks slow motion video recording
This reverts commit ddff1a93bac277b1a0ba14c601d5236c3c36365d.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit 5e1c739e4622428fa0b8fd9350946c31d2424b8e
Author: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
Date: Sun Oct 28 14:32:43 2018 +0100
Revert "msm: camera: Framedrop notification"
This reverts commit 5925180360bca209c21e9271e277caaca68bcad5.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit 0ef5dc40955cd7946f0a851feda516c34dc40d6d
Author: YaroST12 <yaro330@gmail.com>
Date: Sat Oct 6 18:31:20 2018 +0530
Revert "msm: camera: sensor: Adapting sensor driver to soc layer"
* Kernel panics at boot
This reverts commit 6b99b4c9a1706f8f7f1745af97e0f4bddecf168b.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit 1da8c59614f005d524455147fd78fc5f32cfa33b
Author: Subhajeet Muhuri <kenny3fcb@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Oct 5 12:24:29 2018 +0530
Revert "msm: camera: sensor: Updating soc layer clock API for i2c drivers"
* Required for the proper revert of 6b99b4c
This reverts commit a4663702036e6b0ae9b82691027d9913d65d7a02.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit 1b138397ea01ae70f653baf6c812fb5748b3783b
Author: Subhajeet Muhuri <kenny3fcb@gmail.com>
Date: Sat Oct 6 18:19:19 2018 +0530
Revert "msm: camera: Add regulator enable and disable independent of CSID"
* Required for the proper revert of 6b99b4c
This reverts commit fd39134867896ec5c28ce348816e31e7785e06ba.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
commit 12e0c65509260092e8c3f22717080427a78c9469
Author: Subhajeet Muhuri <kenny3fcb@gmail.com>
Date: Sat Oct 6 18:16:32 2018 +0530
Revert "msm: camera: Add regulator enable and disable in csiphy"
* Required for the proper revert of 6b99b4c
This reverts commit d3e47e331617af3c87138bd205e65c6fa1a1bca7.
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Iaa6aa22bb518b930141092fab9f51567c7eae092
|
|
Commit cd9e61ed1eebbcd5dfad59475d41ec58d9b64b6a upstream.
Patch series "rbtree: Cache leftmost node internally", v4.
A series to extending rbtrees to internally cache the leftmost node such
that we can have fast overlap check optimization for all interval tree
users[1]. The benefits of this series are that:
(i) Unify users that do internal leftmost node caching.
(ii) Optimize all interval tree users.
(iii) Convert at least two new users (epoll and procfs) to the new interface.
This patch (of 16):
Red-black tree semantics imply that nodes with smaller or greater (or
equal for duplicates) keys always be to the left and right,
respectively. For the kernel this is extremely evident when considering
our rb_first() semantics. Enabling lookups for the smallest node in the
tree in O(1) can save a good chunk of cycles in not having to walk down
the tree each time. To this end there are a few core users that
explicitly do this, such as the scheduler and rtmutexes. There is also
the desire for interval trees to have this optimization allowing faster
overlap checking.
This patch introduces a new 'struct rb_root_cached' which is just the
root with a cached pointer to the leftmost node. The reason why the
regular rb_root was not extended instead of adding a new structure was
that this allows the user to have the choice between memory footprint
and actual tree performance. The new wrappers on top of the regular
rb_root calls are:
- rb_first_cached(cached_root) -- which is a fast replacement
for rb_first.
- rb_insert_color_cached(node, cached_root, new)
- rb_erase_cached(node, cached_root)
In addition, augmented cached interfaces are also added for basic
insertion and deletion operations; which becomes important for the
interval tree changes.
With the exception of the inserts, which adds a bool for updating the
new leftmost, the interfaces are kept the same. To this end, porting rb
users to the cached version becomes really trivial, and keeping current
rbtree semantics for users that don't care about the optimization
requires zero overhead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719014603.19029-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Harsh Shandilya <harsh@prjkt.io>
|
|
All related codes have been removed since commit c457926b166c introduced
by LA.UM.7.2.r1-05400-sdm660.0 CAF tag.
Signed-off-by: Albert I <krascgq@outlook.co.id>
Signed-off-by: Davide Garberi <dade.garberi@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I3d8e6ac169e2f2712ae839c6a67f8e288a4511de
|
|
commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.
Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.
This still allows a transition of 2 -> {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -> {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.
We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 <-> 2.
Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.9]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
|
|
This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers
that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through
blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT
spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were
changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset
in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We
have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers.
Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read
only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86,
arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by
default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore,
we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our
todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and
first implementation since around netconf 2016.
We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF
code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit
to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger
programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some
part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved
guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase
to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test
case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which
can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this,
additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump
(and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally
the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default.
For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option
bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so
that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons,
the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants
for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off
performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added
the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which
is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no
further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended,
rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this
functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT
compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a
generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is
then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few
changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one.
This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390
without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF
can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can
be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that
bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(),
and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the
passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the
process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter.
Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we
return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning,
interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as
usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of
a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal
to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like
in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers
when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one
abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT
phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written
program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture.
The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32
and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a
small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this
is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND,
and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register
is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on
BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is
newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction.
64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and
patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to
call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other()
pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register.
Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT:
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax
48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax
4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax
52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax
57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax
5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax
[...]
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d
3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d
46: mov %r10d,%eax
49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d
4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d
56: mov %r10d,%eax
59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d
5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d
66: mov %r10d,%eax
69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d
6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d
76: mov %r10d,%eax
79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d
7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d
86: mov %r10d,%eax
89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d
8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d
96: mov %r10d,%eax
[...]
As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden
when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based
to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective.
Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and
over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded.
Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just
JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we
still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal
use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing
up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko
suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding
was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in
the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance
for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case,
f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT),
35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter).
BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various
bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were
running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and
redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests
pass.
[1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
[2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/
[3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
|
|
The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit
most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+
deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby.
And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One
that is per event still needs to be put in place tho.
The new file is:
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
127
Chaging it:
# echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
256
But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get:
# echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
-bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy
#
Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there
is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter
of having no callchain users at that point.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chatur27 <jasonbright2709@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Ic34ecdb4cc1e61257a2926062aa23c960dbd3b8f
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1c15b05baea71a5ff98235783e3e4ad227760876 ]
When 802.3ad bond mode is configured the ad_actor_system option is set to
"00:00:00:00:00:00". But when trying to set the all-zeroes MAC as actors'
system address it was failing with EINVAL.
An all-zeroes ethernet address is valid, only multicast addresses are not
valid values.
Fixes: 171a42c38c6e ("bonding: add netlink support for sys prio, actor sys mac, and port key")
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211221111345.2462-1-ffmancera@riseup.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 778cb8e39f6ec252be50fc3850d66f3dcbd5dd5a ]
"PAGESIZE / 512" is the number of ECC chunks.
"ECC_BYTES" is the number of bytes needed to store a single ECC code.
"2" is the space reserved by the bad block marker.
"2 + (PAGESIZE / 512) * ECC_BYTES" should of course be lower or equal
than the total number of OOB bytes, otherwise it won't fit.
Fix the equation by substituting s/>=/<=/.
Suggested-by: Ryan J. Barnett <ryan.barnett@collins.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20210610143945.3504781-1-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b38e7819cae946e2edf869e604af1e65a5d241c5 ]
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used
by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided
in an upcoming academic publication.
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers
no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I8373925e50fd35fd35d59fd32b8a0e7da9257683
Git-commit: d6c552505c0d1719dda42b4af2def0618bd7bf54
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm
Signed-off-by: urevanth <urevanth@codeaurora.org>
|
|
commit 2efc459d06f1630001e3984854848a5647086232 upstream.
Output defects can exist in sysfs content using sprintf and snprintf.
sprintf does not know the PAGE_SIZE maximum of the temporary buffer
used for outputting sysfs content and it's possible to overrun the
PAGE_SIZE buffer length.
Add a generic sysfs_emit function that knows that the size of the
temporary buffer and ensures that no overrun is done.
Add a generic sysfs_emit_at function that can be used in multiple
call situations that also ensures that no overrun is done.
Validate the output buffer argument to be page aligned.
Validate the offset len argument to be within the PAGE_SIZE buf.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/884235202216d464d61ee975f7465332c86f76b2.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4d521943f76bd0d1e68ea5e02df7aadd30b2838a ]
GPIO_ACTIVE_x flags are not correct in the context of interrupt flags.
These are simple defines so they could be used in DTS but they will not
have the same meaning:
1. GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH = 0 = IRQ_TYPE_NONE
2. GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW = 1 = IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING
Correct the interrupt flags, assuming the author of the code wanted same
logical behavior behind the name "ACTIVE_xxx", this is:
ACTIVE_LOW => IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW
ACTIVE_HIGH => IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH
Fixes: a1a8b4594f8d ("NFC: pn544: i2c: Add DTS Documentation")
Fixes: 6be88670fc59 ("NFC: nxp-nci_i2c: Add I2C support to NXP NCI driver")
Fixes: e3b329221567 ("dt-bindings: can: tcan4x5x: Update binding to use interrupt property")
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> # for tcan4x5x.txt
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201026153620.89268-1-krzk@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070 upstream.
In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.
In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.
The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).
How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).
This is part of XSA-332.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b38e7819cae946e2edf869e604af1e65a5d241c5 ]
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used
by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided
in an upcoming academic publication.
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers
no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 95364f36701e62dd50eee91e1303187fd1a9f567 upstream.
In case a driver wants to return an error from qc_prep, return enum
ata_completion_errors. sata_mv is one of those drivers -- see the next
patch. Other drivers return the newly defined AC_ERR_OK.
[v2] use enum ata_completion_errors and AC_ERR_OK.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: linux-ide@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
implementaion
[ Upstream commit 8c149b7d75e53be47648742f40fc90d9fc6fa63a ]
The required supplies in bindings were actually not matching
implementation making the bindings incorrect and misleading. The Linux
kernel driver requires all supplies to be present. Also for wlf,wm8994
uses just DBVDD-supply instead of DBVDDn-supply (n: <1,3>).
Reported-by: Jonathan Bakker <xc-racer2@live.ca>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200501133534.6706-1-krzk@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d3a84a8d0dde4e26bc084b36ffcbdc5932ac85e2 ]
The basic permission bits (protection bits in AmigaOS) have been broken
in Linux' AFFS - it would only set bits, but never delete them.
Also, contrary to the documentation, the Archived bit was not handled.
Let's fix this for good, and set the bits such that Linux and classic
AmigaOS can coexist in the most peaceful manner.
Also, update the documentation to represent the current state of things.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Staudt <max@enpas.org>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit df16c33a4028159d1ba8a7061c9fa950b58d1a61 ]
IIO_CONCENTRATION together with INFO_RAW specifier is used for reporting
raw concentrations of pollutants. Raw value should be meaningless
before being properly scaled. Because of that description shouldn't
mention raw value unit whatsoever.
Fix this by rephrasing existing description so it follows conventions
used throughout IIO ABI docs.
Fixes: 8ff6b3bc94930 ("iio: chemical: Add IIO_CONCENTRATION channel type")
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Duszynski <tomasz.duszynski@octakon.com>
Acked-by: Matt Ranostay <matt.ranostay@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream
Make the docs match the code.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream
Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.
[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.
While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* Export vulnerability status via sysfs
* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.
[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This patch removes the need of subdir-y. Now all files/directories under
arch/<arch>/include/uapi/ are exported.
The only change for userland is the layout of the command 'make
headers_install_all': directories asm-<arch> are replaced by arch-<arch>/.
Those new directories contains all files/directories of the specified arch.
Note that only cris and tile have more directories than only asm:
- arch-v[10|32] for cris;
- arch for tile.
Change-Id: I4b28551874c90a166f56af9adf1ef933b343dd04
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Git-Commit: 61562f981e9284ff7dfb2769d89c750986a5f677
Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
[bharad@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Naitik Bharadiya <bharad@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
|
|
Originally, generated-y and genhdr-y had different meaning, like
follows:
- generated-y: generated headers (other than asm-generic wrappers)
- header-y : headers to be exported
- genhdr-y : generated headers to be exported (generated-y + header-y)
Since commit fcc8487d477a ("uapi: export all headers under uapi
directories"), headers under UAPI directories are all exported.
So, there is no more difference between generated-y and genhdr-y.
We see two users of genhdr-y, arch/{arm,x86}/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild.
They generate some headers in arch/{arm,x86}/include/generated/uapi/asm
directories, which are obviously exported.
Replace them with generated-y, and abolish genhdr-y.
Change-Id: I9b8b97c39673e93e3d1215090f31d68beffddbd7
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Git-Commit: ae3f4151737d2aad271e5b1f2553c5d56e52850c
Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
[bharad@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Naitik Bharadiya <bharad@codeaurora.org>
[schikk@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
|
|
Regularly, when a new header is created in include/uapi/, the developer
forgets to add it in the corresponding Kbuild file. This error is usually
detected after the release is out.
In fact, all headers under uapi directories should be exported, thus it's
useless to have an exhaustive list.
After this patch, the following files, which were not exported, are now
exported (with make headers_install_all):
asm-arc/kvm_para.h
asm-arc/ucontext.h
asm-blackfin/shmparam.h
asm-blackfin/ucontext.h
asm-c6x/shmparam.h
asm-c6x/ucontext.h
asm-cris/kvm_para.h
asm-h8300/shmparam.h
asm-h8300/ucontext.h
asm-hexagon/shmparam.h
asm-m32r/kvm_para.h
asm-m68k/kvm_para.h
asm-m68k/shmparam.h
asm-metag/kvm_para.h
asm-metag/shmparam.h
asm-metag/ucontext.h
asm-mips/hwcap.h
asm-mips/reg.h
asm-mips/ucontext.h
asm-nios2/kvm_para.h
asm-nios2/ucontext.h
asm-openrisc/shmparam.h
asm-parisc/kvm_para.h
asm-powerpc/perf_regs.h
asm-sh/kvm_para.h
asm-sh/ucontext.h
asm-tile/shmparam.h
asm-unicore32/shmparam.h
asm-unicore32/ucontext.h
asm-x86/hwcap2.h
asm-xtensa/kvm_para.h
drm/armada_drm.h
drm/etnaviv_drm.h
drm/vgem_drm.h
linux/aspeed-lpc-ctrl.h
linux/auto_dev-ioctl.h
linux/bcache.h
linux/btrfs_tree.h
linux/can/vxcan.h
linux/cifs/cifs_mount.h
linux/coresight-stm.h
linux/cryptouser.h
linux/fsmap.h
linux/genwqe/genwqe_card.h
linux/hash_info.h
linux/kcm.h
linux/kcov.h
linux/kfd_ioctl.h
linux/lightnvm.h
linux/module.h
linux/nbd-netlink.h
linux/nilfs2_api.h
linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h
linux/nsfs.h
linux/pr.h
linux/qrtr.h
linux/rpmsg.h
linux/sched/types.h
linux/sed-opal.h
linux/smc.h
linux/smc_diag.h
linux/stm.h
linux/switchtec_ioctl.h
linux/vfio_ccw.h
linux/wil6210_uapi.h
rdma/bnxt_re-abi.h
Note that I have removed from this list the files which are generated in every
exported directories (like .install or .install.cmd).
Thanks to Julien Floret <julien.floret@6wind.com> for the tip to get all
subdirs with a pure makefile command.
For the record, note that exported files for asm directories are a mix of
files listed by:
- include/uapi/asm-generic/Kbuild.asm;
- arch/<arch>/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild;
- arch/<arch>/include/asm/Kbuild.
Change-Id: I132df74f736b8f35f77390eaa12804e74ef536ee
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Git-Commit: fcc8487d477a3452a1d0ccbdd4c5e0e1e3cb8bed
Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
[bharad@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Naitik Bharadiya <bharad@codeaurora.org>
[schikk@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
|
|
Support 2 separate device nodes with this change, one for ADSP/SLPI
and another for CDSP.
Change-Id: I2a09ebfdeccd9a092b1a3602c249b2727ec91c93
Acked-by: Amol Mahesh <amahesh@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>
|
|
commit 47c3e7783be4e142b861d34b5c2e223330b05d8a upstream.
PPPOL2TP_MSG_* and L2TP_MSG_* are duplicates, and are being used
interchangeably in the kernel, so let's standardize on L2TP_MSG_*
internally, and keep PPPOL2TP_MSG_* defined in UAPI for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.st>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Giuliano Procida <gprocida@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Track generated header files which aren't already in genhdr-y, alongside
generic-y wrappers in the */include/generated/[uapi/]asm/ directories.
Currently only x86 generates extra headers in these directories, for the
purposes of enumerating system calls for different ABIs, and xen
hypercalls.
This will allow the asm-generic wrapper handling code to remove stale
wrappers when files are removed from generic-y, without also removing
these headers which are generated separately.
Change-Id: I67d31c0f32a9182be25a1a6c56512b51e85da9b2
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466808144-23209-2-git-send-email-james.hogan@imgtec.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Git-commit: 54b880caf15034644b564e378abf67b7f9eaf4dc
Git-repo: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.14/
[schikk@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
|
|
This option was added in commit c7bb349e7c25 ("kbuild: introduce destination-y
for exported headers") but never used in-tree.
Change-Id: I76b74c900898670f08abaf1f0e8f4ada2a0962ca
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Git-Commit: bd73a328cbb5731000bb3fd876189d9395c0cd61
Git-Repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
[bharad@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Naitik Bharadiya <bharad@codeaurora.org>
[schikk@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
|
|
commit 4054ab64e29bb05b3dfe758fff3c38a74ba753bb upstream.
A recent change to the netlink code: 6e237d099fac ("netlink: Relax attr
validation for fixed length types") logs a warning when programs send
messages with invalid attributes (e.g., wrong length for a u32). Yafang
reported this error message for tools/accounting/getdelays.c.
send_cmd() is wrongly adding 1 to the attribute length. As noted in
include/uapi/linux/netlink.h nla_len should be NLA_HDRLEN + payload
length, so drop the +1.
Fixes: 9e06d3f9f6b1 ("per task delay accounting taskstats interface: documentation fix")
Reported-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327173111.63922-1-dsahern@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 26d5bb9e4c4b541c475751e015072eb2cbf70d15 ]
FMAN DMA read or writes under heavy traffic load may cause FMAN
internal resource leak; thus stopping further packet processing.
The FMAN internal queue can overflow when FMAN splits single
read or write transactions into multiple smaller transactions
such that more than 17 AXI transactions are in flight from FMAN
to interconnect. When the FMAN internal queue overflows, it can
stall further packet processing. The issue can occur with any one
of the following three conditions:
1. FMAN AXI transaction crosses 4K address boundary (Errata
A010022)
2. FMAN DMA address for an AXI transaction is not 16 byte
aligned, i.e. the last 4 bits of an address are non-zero
3. Scatter Gather (SG) frames have more than one SG buffer in
the SG list and any one of the buffers, except the last
buffer in the SG list has data size that is not a multiple
of 16 bytes, i.e., other than 16, 32, 48, 64, etc.
With any one of the above three conditions present, there is
likelihood of stalled FMAN packet processing, especially under
stress with multiple ports injecting line-rate traffic.
To avoid situations that stall FMAN packet processing, all of the
above three conditions must be avoided; therefore, configure the
system with the following rules:
1. Frame buffers must not span a 4KB address boundary, unless
the frame start address is 256 byte aligned
2. All FMAN DMA start addresses (for example, BMAN buffer
address, FD[address] + FD[offset]) are 16B aligned
3. SG table and buffer addresses are 16B aligned and the size
of SG buffers are multiple of 16 bytes, except for the last
SG buffer that can be of any size.
Additional workaround notes:
- Address alignment of 64 bytes is recommended for maximally
efficient system bus transactions (although 16 byte alignment is
sufficient to avoid the stall condition)
- To support frame sizes that are larger than 4K bytes, there are
two options:
1. Large single buffer frames that span a 4KB page boundary can
be converted into SG frames to avoid transaction splits at
the 4KB boundary,
2. Align the large single buffer to 256B address boundaries,
ensure that the frame address plus offset is 256B aligned.
- If software generated SG frames have buffers that are unaligned
and with random non-multiple of 16 byte lengths, before
transmitting such frames via FMAN, frames will need to be copied
into a new single buffer or multiple buffer SG frame that is
compliant with the three rules listed above.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
Support 2 separate device nodes with this change, one for ADSP/SLPI
and another for CDSP.
Change-Id: I2a09ebfdeccd9a092b1a3602c249b2727ec91c93
Acked-by: Amol Mahesh <amahesh@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>
|
|
This enum is already perfectly aliased to enum nl80211_band, and
the only reason for it is that we get IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS out of
it. There's no really good reason to not declare the number of
bands in nl80211 though, so do that and remove the cfg80211 one.
Change-Id: Ifc56e6297146c9095432b757fabd0c463d7cc583
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Bug: 62057517
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm/+/56f601d6bb9e51c3c8a79a5f40878b8d1e6ff481
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
|
|
commit 73668309215285366c433489de70d31362987be9 upstream.
mei client bus added the client protocol version to the device alias,
but ABI documentation was not updated.
Fixes: b26864cad1c9 (mei: bus: add client protocol version to the device alias)
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191008005735.12707-1-tomas.winkler@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
BFQ-v8r12 up to 887cf43acdb1d5415fa678e4a63be8fe1bab2d3a
Change-Id: I4725397969026ff9fa969d598c4378f24800c31d
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martinz <alex@amartinz.at>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
|
|
In certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be NA proxies
that use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.
To prevent unsolicitd advertisements on the shared medium from
being a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.
Enable this by providing an option called "drop_unsolicited_na".
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit aec215e7aa380fe5f85eb6948766b58bf78cb6c3)
Change-Id: Iad429a767a786087b0985632be44932b2e3fd1a8
|
|
In certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be ARP proxies
that use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.
To prevent gratuitous ARP frames on the shared medium from being
a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.
Enable this by providing an option called "drop_gratuitous_arp".
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 4078228159c9f54cca7347a8bdace29f2abdef65)
Change-Id: I8772dbd7471085878f8b4161eb2a056d79b8b232
|
|
In order to solve a problem with 802.11, the so-called hole-196 attack,
add an option (sysctl) called "drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast" which, if
enabled, causes the stack to drop IPv6 unicast packets encapsulated in
link-layer multi- or broadcast frames. Such frames can (as an attack)
be created by any member of the same wireless network and transmitted
as valid encrypted frames since the symmetric key for broadcast frames
is shared between all stations.
Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit dede82143bf1bbf92ea73a519bb0298b19c56cb9)
Change-Id: I76c8f84b53e95c40ad3c2b5adac0ec4964cc920c
|
|
In order to solve a problem with 802.11, the so-called hole-196 attack,
add an option (sysctl) called "drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast" which, if
enabled, causes the stack to drop IPv4 unicast packets encapsulated in
link-layer multi- or broadcast frames. Such frames can (as an attack)
be created by any member of the same wireless network and transmitted
as valid encrypted frames since the symmetric key for broadcast frames
is shared between all stations.
Additionally, enabling this option provides compliance with a SHOULD
clause of RFC 1122.
Change-Id: I8de9fa5bdbea0556802f2ee553d0e73c1349213e
Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
