diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7c43ae782b26..8c7444857a4b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1488,7 +1488,8 @@ static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work) keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS; smp_wmb(); ip_cnt++; - schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL); + schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, + round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL)); } static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void) @@ -1664,15 +1665,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number); * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of * depleting entropy is too high */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash); unsigned int get_random_int(void) { - /* - * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself - * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited - * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We - * also mix it with jiffies and the PID: - */ - return secure_ip_id((__force __be32)(current->pid + jiffies)); + struct keydata *keyptr; + __u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); + int ret; + + keyptr = get_keyptr(); + hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles(); + + ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret); + put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); + + return ret; } /* |